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ABSTRACT
The Persian Gulf War of 1991 highlighted the gulf 
between the executive and legislative branches over the 
extent of the president's constitutional and practical war 
powers. President Bush appealed to his constitutional 
designation as commander-in-chief, among other things, as 
well as U.N. authorization in asserting broad authority to 
conduct extensive military activity in the Persian Gulf. 
Congress, on the other hand, countered by invoking their 
plenary constitutional war powers and the requirements of 
the War Powers Resolution. This thesis examines that 
controversial and recurring debate.
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CHAPTER 1
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
I . INTRODUCTION
The debate over the appropriate allocation of war 
powers between the president and Congress has raged since 
the Constitution was drafted. The president, as commander- 
in-chief, possesses broad discretion in exercizing his 
authority over military affairs and foreign policy. His 
power is balanced, however, by the constitutional 
requirement that Congress declare war, raise armies, and 
appropriate funds. In a modern context, these shared and 
divided war powers have led to a complex and continuing 
debate over how the Founders intended war powers to be 
defined and, notwithstanding their intentions, whether 
presidential practice and congressional acquiesence have 
changed the Constitution's meaning.
The discussion over war powers has been complicated by 
passage of the War Powers Resolution, an attempt by Congress 
to reassert authority over military deployments, and by 
America's membership in the United Nations, whose requests 
for American involvement in multilateral military operations 
have increased dramatically in the last decade. The Persian
1
Gulf War encompassed all these factors and provides a 
classic example of the struggle between the president and 
Congrebs over how America should go to war. Considering the 
escalating number of global conflicts involving American 
troops, it is a question that transcends the Gulf War and 
certainly one that warrants further examination.
II. OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
The events surrounding the initiation of the Persian 
Gulf War illustrate the disagreement between the executive 
branch and the legislative branch over the extent and scope 
of the president's unilateral military authority.
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait.
The next day President George Bush met with key advisors 
from the National Security Council, his cabinet, and the 
military to formulate a U.S. response. General Norman 
Schwarzkopf, leader of Central Command, presented a 
previously designed plan (Operations Plan 90-1002) for 
defending Saudi Arabia that involved the deployment of 
150,000 troops.1 National Security Advisor Brent 
Scowcroft, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, and Joint Chiefs 
Chair Colin Powell favored a military response.2
1 Time Magazine, Otto Friedrich, ed. , Desert Storm: 
The War in the Persian Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 
1991), p. 24.
2 U.S. News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory 
(New York: Times Books, 1992), p. 65.
3
President Bush immediately ordered three aircraft 
carriers to the region and NATO was informed of a possible 
troop deployment. Although the President publicly assured 
the nation that the U.S. was not contemplating military 
action, he did indicate at a press conference on August 3 
that the U.S. would not allow Iraq to retain Kuwait: "I
view very seriously our determination to reverse out this 
agression. . . . This will not stand. This will not stand.
This agresssion against Kuwait."3 Saudi Arabia initially 
declined the President's offer of troops but after several 
days of negotiations and a visit to Saudi Arabia by 
Secretary Cheney to emphasize the Iraqi threat, King Fahd 
decided to permit the deployment.
Meanwhile, President Bush and Secretary of State James 
Baker began extensive diplomatic discussions with numerous 
countries to establish a coalition willing to impose 
economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iraq.4 Once 
President Bush decided to send soldiers, these countries 
were similarly solicited to commit troops to a multinational 
U.N. force led by the United States. The Bush 
administration promised to forgive billions of dollars in
3 James P. Pfiffner, "Presidential Policy-making and
the Gulf War, " in The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War. 
Marcia Lynn Whicker, James P. Pfiffner and Raymond A. Moore 
eds. (Westport, CN: Praeger Series in Presidential Studies,
1993), p. 4.
4 Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm (New York: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 112.
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debt to critical countries such as Syria, Egypt and Turkey, 
in exchange for their support of the U.S. military 
deployment.
President Bush ordered the deployment of troops to 
Saudi Arabia on August 6th. He publicly announced on August 
8th that the U.S. would send a possible 50,000 troops to 
Saudi Arabia, and officially notified Congress of the 
deployment the next day. According to presidential 
spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater, the President's letter to 
congressional leaders informing them of the deployment was 
"consistent with the War Powers Resolution" but was not the 
formal notification required by the legislation.5 In a 
speech announcing the military action, President Bush 
explained that the troops' mission was "wholly defensive" 
and that they would "not initiate hostilities."6 President 
Bush also stated that the time restrictions of the War 
Powers Resolution should not be commenced as American troops 
would not be faced with immediate hostilities. Within two 
weeks, nearly 100,000 American troops were deployed in the
5 Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War (New York: 
Henry Holt & Co., 1992), p. 106. President Bush's statement 
was consistent with previous presidents who, while not 
explicitly repudiating the WPR and facing a confrontation with 
Congress, sought to avoid its reporting requirements by filing 
reports that merely paid lip service to the resolution.
6 Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf 
War Reader (New York: Times Books, 1991), p. 199.
5
Gulf.7 Originally, Congress strongly supported the 
President's decision to defend Saudi Arabia. For example, 
House Speaker Tom Foley was quoted as saying, "Democrats and 
Republicans, House and Senate . . . are very strongly of the
opinion that the president had to act."8
Despite the extensive discussions about military action 
taking place within the Bush Administration and with its 
international allies, the only legislator informed of 
President Bush's decision to send troops prior to their 
deployment was Senator Sam Nunn, Chairperson of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee.9 Although Congress immediately 
constituted a committee of eighteen members for the 
President to consult if he contemplated hostilities, 
President Bush ignored it. On August 22, President Bush 
first acknowledged the possibility of offensive action when 
he responded to reporters' queries about a potential use of 
force: "I don't rule in or rule out the use of force."10
As the magnitude of the deployment became apparent, 
several legislators expressed misgivings about the 
President's unilateral military commitments. Senator Joseph
7 Robert J. Spitzer, "The Conflict Between Congress 
and the President Over War, " in The Presidency and the Persian 
Gulf War, p. 28.
8 Smith, p. 102.
9 James A. Nathan, "Revising the War Powers Act,"
Armed Forces and Society 17 (Summer 1991), p. 513.
Smith, p. 138.
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Biden was quoted as saying he was "struck at the size of 
this. This is a big, big deal. . . I never contemplated
talk of 250,000 troops." He added that there should be "not 
only some consultation, but some extensive debate."11 On 
September 17, Representative Henry Gonzalez expressed a 
similar sentiment in a letter to House Speaker Foley: "Do 
we have a president? Or a Caesar? A monarch? A potentate . .
. What happened to the power invested in Congress to declare 
war?1,12
President Bush's assertion that U.S. troops were not 
deployed into a hostile situation seemed contradicted by the 
facts. Satellite photos indicated that a large number of 
Iraqi troops were massed on the border of Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. As the first American troops arrived in the region, 
Iraq deployed 50,000 more troops to the Saudi border.13 By 
late September, the Pentagon estimated that Iraq had 430,000 
troops and 2,800 tanks in Kuwait. U.S. troop strength was 
estimated at slightly more than 150, 000.14 Although 
President Bush and his advisors were not certain that Iraq 
would attack Saudi Arabia and embroil American troops in
11 The Gulf War Reader, p. 360.
12 Hiro, p. 190.
13 Arthur H. Blair, At War in the Gulf (College
Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1992), p. 17.
14 Ibid. , pp. 29 , 31.
7
war, the President acknowledged the seriousness of the Iraqi
threat in a speech on August 8, 1990:
But we must recognize that Iraq may not stop using
force to advance its ambitions. Iraq has amassed an 
enormous war machine on the Saudi border capable of 
initiating hostilities with little or no additional 
preparations. Given the Iraqi government's history of 
aggression against its own citizens as well as its 
neighbors, to assume Iraq will not attack again would 
be unwise and unrealistic.15
The public, and hence not suprisingly, the majority of 
Congress continued to support the President's policy in the 
Persian Gulf throughout the fall. On October 1, 1990, both 
houses of Congress overwhelmingly passed resolutions that 
supported the troop deployment.16 Leaders of both Houses 
made clear, however, that their approval of the President's
actions did not authorize the use of force. As the troop
buildup continued, a few members of Congress began to 
increasingly question the President's actions. Although no 
vote was taken, Senator Mark Hatfield introduced legislation 
requiring the President to invoke the War Powers Resolution 
(WPR) or ask for specific congressional approval.17 
Secretary Cheney, among others in the administration, did 
not want Congress to meddle in the President's foreign 
policy and was quoted as he candidly acknowledged: "As a
15 The Gulf War Reader, p. 198.
16 The House voted 380 in favor and 2 9 against the
resolution. The Senate passed the resolution by an even 
larger margin: 96-3.
Smith, p. 172.
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former member, I have to say it was an advantage that 
Congress was out of town" when troops were initially 
committed.18
Congress adjourned in October with the provision that
it could be recalled on two days notice if required. By the
middle of October, President Bush asked advisors whether
Hussein could be ejected from Kuwait with the existing
number of ground forces.19 The military was then requested
to prepare a preliminary attack plan.20 On October 31,
President Bush secretly approved the timetable for a January
air battle and a February land offensive.21 Later,
President Bush was to tell U.S. News and World Report:
I became convinced early on that, if diplomacy failed, 
we would indeed have to use force. . .  I kept hoping 
that the use of force could be avoided. I cannot 
pinpoint all of this to a certain date, but I was 
determined from the very beginning that aggression 
would not stand . . ,22
Throughout October, President Bush repeatedly discussed 
offensive options with military leaders, coalition members, 
and the administration. However, during several meetings 
with congressional leaders he failed to inform them of any
18 Ibid., p. 172.
19 Triumph Without Victory, p. 155, 166.
20 Smith, p. 188.
21 Hiro, p. 229.
22 Triumph Without Victory, p. 172.
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possible offensive action.23 Congressman William
Broomfield put it succinctly:
While the president has taken great pains to consult 
with the Soviets, the Syrians, the Egyptians, the 
Saudis, the French, the Germans, the British, and many 
others at the United Nations . . . his administration
has failed adequately to consult with the American 
Congress.24
Although President Bush clearly understood the practical 
political necessity of garnering international support for 
his actions in the Persian Gulf, he ignored the equally 
important political necessity of marshalling domestic 
support by coordinating his military response with the U.S. 
Congress.
III. OPERATION DESERT STORM
On November 8, shortly after congressional mid-term 
elections and while Congress was in recess, President Bush 
announced that the number of troops in the Gulf would be 
doubled to 430, 000.25 He explained in a news conference:
23 Smith, p. 198. It should be noted that author Dilip 
Hiro stated President Bush initiated talks with Congress on 
October 5 regarding the possible use of force. (Hiro, p. 
225) .
The vast majority of Persian Gulf War authors, however, 
maintain that the President did not discuss his plans with 
Congress nor did he ever indicate that congressional 
authorization was required.
24 Smith, p. 204.
25 At least one author describes a build-up of that 
magnitude as the point of no return on the road to war. 
(Pfiffner, p. 7).
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After consultation with King Fahd and our other allies, 
I have today directed the secretary of defense to 
increase the size of U.S. forces committed to Desert 
Shield to insure that the coalition has an adequate 
offensive military option should that be necessary to 
achieve our common goals.26
Shortly after the announcement, Secretary Cheney stated 
the position of the executive branch to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee as follows: "I do not believe the
President requires any additional authorization before 
committing U.S. forces to achieve our objectives in the 
Gulf."27 During an exchange with reporters in late 
October, President Bush had similarly insisted he possessed 
the power to initiate unilateral military activity without 
authorization from Congress: "History is replete with
examples where the president has to take action. And I've 
done this in the past (Panama) and certainly . . . would
have no hesitancy at all."28 Congressional Democrats were 
angered by the timing of the announcement and believed that 
it was related more to domestic political considerations 
than to military considerations.29
26 Quoted in The Gulf War Reader, pp. 228-29. When 
questioned about the troop increase the next day, President 
Bush added, "I have not ruled out the use of force at all . .
. and I think that is evident by what we're doing here today." 
(Triumph Without Victory, p. 176).
27 Quoted by Harold Honju Koh, "Presidential War and 
Congressional Consent: The Law Professors Memorandum in
Dellums v. Bush." Stanford Journal of International Law 27 
(Spring 1991), p. 248.
28 Smith, p. 4 n. 17.
29 Triumph Without Victory, p. 177.
11
In the Gulf War Reader. Washington Monthly editor James
Bennet reviewed numerous newspaper accounts and concluded
there were earlier clues that should have indicated the
administration was preparing an offensive. For example, as
early as September 16, The New York Times reported:
The question here has shifted from how well the United 
States and its allies would defend the Saudi kingdom to 
how well Washington and its allies might exercise an 
"offensive option" to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait.30
Author Dilip Hiro similarly argued that the decision to
implement an offensive response was taken much earlier than
November. He asserted that the September 17th dismissal of
General Michael Dugan for revealing offensive military
details to reporters signaled the end of the defensive phase
of Desert Shield and the commencement of the offensive
phase.31
Ironically enough, although the Bush Administration 
thought congressional authorization was unnecessary, they 
strongly believed international approval was crucial before 
offensive force was used.32 During the months following 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the United Nations passed 
twelve resolutions condemning the invasion, imposing 
economic sanctions, demanding the release of hostages, and
The Gulf War Reader, p. 360. 
Hiro, p. 189.
Triumph Without Victory, p. 173.
demanding an Iraqi withdrawal.33 The most critical of 
these, U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, was passed on 
November 29th after extensive U.S. diplomatic efforts. It 
stated that member states might use "all necessary means" to 
enforce previous resolutions if Iraq did not leave Kuwait by 
January 15, 1991. After the vote on the resolution, Under 
Secretary of State Bob Kimmitt stated, "We feel like we now 
have a strong basis in international law for the use of 
force."34 President Bush subsequently asserted that he had 
the constitutional authority to use force to implement the 
U.N. resolution without further congressional 
authorization.35
As it became apparent that President Bush believed he 
could initiate offensive military action in Kuwait without 
reference to Congress, an increasing number of legislators
33 James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From Shield to 
Storm (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1992), p. 34-35.
34 Triumph Without Victory, p. 182.
35 Mathew D. Berger, "Implementing a United Nations 
Security Council Resolution: The Presidential Power to Use
Force Without the Authorization of Congress," Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review 15 (Fall 1991), p. 
84 .
In Triumph Without Victory, the authors argue that 
innumerable post-war interviews reveal:
The decision to seek United Nations involvment was 
part of a larger, more cynical strategy of the Bush 
administration to circumvent Congress, to bypass 
the constitutional authority of Congress--and only 
Congress-- to declare war. (Triumph Without 
Victory, p. viii).
Later, a confidant of Secretary Baker was quoted as saying, 
"How could the United States not support something that 
Ethiopia was supporting?" (Ibid., p. 198).
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became vocally opposed to the President's position. On 
November 10, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell stated 
that the President "must come to Congress and ask for a 
declaration. If he does not get it, then there is no legal 
authority for the United States to go to war."36 
Representative Ronald Dellums and 53 other members of 
Congress filed a federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin the 
President from attacking Iraqi troops without express 
congressional approval. Although Judge Harold Greene ruled 
that the issue was not ripe for a decision as the majority 
of Congress had not sought the injunction, he did state the 
following:
An injunction may issue at the request of Members of
Congress to prevent the conduct of a war which is about
to be carried on without congressional authorization .
37
This ruling was significant because it indicated that the 
judge in Dellums. unlike the majority of other courts which 
had dismissed war powers issues summarily, might have 
granted an injunction to the majority of Congress if the 
President had not sought congressional authorization for the 
war.
On November 13, several members of Congress demanded 
that President Bush call a special session of Congress to 
discuss the Persian Gulf conflict. President Bush
36 Quoted by Spitzer, p. 29.
37 Dellums v. Bush. 752 F.Supp. 1141, 1149 (D.D.C.
1990) .
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circumvented the issue by replying that he had not decided 
to use force and the troop increase only made that option 
more credible and possible.38 Senator Nunn began hearings 
on November 27 in front of the Armed Services Committee 
regarding whether the U.S. was becoming involved in war too 
rapidly. Most witnesses, including two former chairs of the 
Joint Chiefs, testified that sanctions were working and 
should be continued.39 Many in Congress also still 
believed that economic and diplomatic pressure could force 
Iraq from Kuwait without the necessity of a military 
response and concommitant loss of life.
On November 30, President Bush told congressional 
leaders he would like a congressional review of his Persian 
Gulf policy but if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by 
the January deadline he would not need to consult with 
Congress prior to commencing the war.40 At a Camp David 
meeting on December 1, the President similarly asserted 
that, although he was concerned with the reaction of 
Congress, he had the legal authority as commander-in-chief 
to commence military activity without congressional 
approval.41
38 Blair, p. 38.
39 Desert Storm, p. 31.
40 Triumph Without Victory, p. 185.
41 Triumph Without Victory, p. 187.
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In a letter to President Bush on December 27, 1990,
Congressman George Miller and 110 other Democratic
representatives emphasized that the U.N. could not authorize
a U.S. offensive:
So long as neither the lives of American citizens nor 
our troops are subjected to immediate danger and the 
international economic embargo continues to exert 
substantial pressure against Iraq . . . offensive
military action by the United States unwisely risks 
massive loss of life . . . (the U.N.) does not commit,
or authorize, the use of United States armed forces.42
Despite congressional misgivings about President Bush's
unilateral military commitment, the majority of Congress
still either tacitly or vocally supported the troop
deployment. This is perhaps not surprising in light of
public opinion polls which indicated that President Bush's
actions maintained broad public support.43 In fact, Senate
leaders planned to recess until January 23rd (after the U.N.
deadline) and consequently avoid directly addressing the
Persian Gulf issue. The strenuous objections of senators
such as Tom Harkin and Brock Adams caused Senate Majority
Leader George Mitchell to reconsider.44 After reviewing
42 Quoted in "Yes, no, maybe," Economist 18 (January 
5-11, 1991), p. 19. It should be pointed out that the U.N. 
has no power to implement its decisions. Member states may 
either comply or refuse to comply with the requests made in 
its resolutions.
43 By December, opinion polls indicated that nearly 6 5% 
of Americans approved using force to achieve the nation's 
goals. (Blair, p. 60) . A poll conducted by the Washington 
Post and ABC News similarly showed that 7 of 10 respondents 
favored the use of force. (Triumph Without Victory, p. 202).
The Gulf War Reader. 260.
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several constitutional considerations, Senator Harkin 
argued:
So any objective reading of the Constitution itself and 
the clear language of the Constitution, or any reading 
of the Federalist Papers, or writings of those who 
drafted this clear clause in the Constitution, can lead 
to only one clear and unambiguous conclusion: that
only Congress can declare war, and the president has 
the power to repel attacks and invasions, which is not 
the situation at hand.45
After continuously maintaining that legislative 
authorization was not needed, President Bush formally 
requested congressional support on January 8th. This 
request followed intensive lobbying by the administration 
which indicated the majority of Congress would support a 
declaration of war. Democratic leaders asked the President 
to forestall offensive action until a vote was taken; 
however, he declined to give any assurances.46 In fact, 
the next day the President commented, "I don't (think I need 
it . . .  I feel I have the authority to fully implement the 
United Nations resolutions."47
A sharply divided Congress passed a joint resolution 
after several days of vigorous debate, authorizing the 
President to "use United States armed forces pursuant to
45 Ibid., p. 262.
46 Ibid., p. 192.
47 Louis Fisher, "Historical Survey of the War Powers 
and the Use of Force, " in The Constitution and the Power to Go 
to War. Gary M. Stern and Morton H. Halperin, eds. (Westport, 
CN: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 25.
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 678. 1,48 The 
resolution expressly maintained that the authorization was 
to be consistent with the War Powers Resolution of 1973.49 
The House also overwhelmingly passed a general resolution 
stating:
The Congress finds that the Constitution of the United 
States vests all power to declare war in the Congress 
of the United States. Any offensive action taken 
against Iraq must be explicitly approved by the 
Congress of the United States before such action may be 
initiated.50
During debate on the resolution, Senator Nunn commended 
the President for "recognizing Congress' constitutional 
role." Representative Richard Durbin similarly concluded 
that "the United States' Constitution has prevailed."S1
48 The Senate voted 52-47 in favor of the resolution.
The House voted 250-183 in favor of the resolution.
49 Congressional acquiescence to the President's policy 
may have been influenced by the fact that Bush did not request 
the vote until only several days remained before the January 
15th deadline. As one commentator notes, several legislators 
did not support the war:
However, the president had got himself, and the country's 
prestige so committed to the deadline set by the United 
Nations (at our behest) that by the time the debate 
began, on Thursday, January 10, there was no question as 
to the outcome of the vote. (The Gulf War Reader, p. 
189) .
. . . George Bush, by working multilaterally through the 
United Nations (and unilaterally making troop 
commitments), had rendered Congress irrelevant. (ibid., 
p. 192).
50 Cong. Rec. H405 (January 12, 1991), p. 302.
51 Michael J. Glennon, "The Gulf War and the 
Constitution," Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991), p. 84.
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President Bush, on the other hand, stated the following upon
signing the resolution:
My request for congressional support did not, and my 
signing of this resolution does not, constitute any 
change in the long-standing position of the executive 
branch on either the President's constitutional 
authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. 
interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers 
Resolution.52
Interestingly enough, President Bush indicated that he
might have commenced Operation Desert Storm even if Congress
had voted against using force. Prior to the vote, the
President repeated remarks made to coalition diplomats at
Christmastime:
it boils down to a very moral case of good versus evil, 
black versus white. If I have to go (to war), its not 
going to matter to me if there isn't one Congressman 
who supports this, or what happens to public opinion.
If it's right, it's gotta be done.53
In his memoirs, former Vice President Dan Quayle concluded
that President Bush would still have initiated the Persian
Gulf War without legislative authorization.54 When asked
after the vote if he could have proceeded if Congress voted
against the resolution, the President replied: "I still
feel that I have the constitutional authority, many
attorneys have so advised me."55
52 Quoted by Koh, p. 2 54, n. 26.
53 Quoted by Smith, p. 237.
54 Dan Quayle, Standing Firm (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1994), p. 227.
55 Quoted by Pfiffner, p. 22 n. 32.
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Considering President Bush's comments and his 
unilateral escalation of the situation in the Persian Gulf 
prior to asking for congressional authorization, if the vote 
was a victory for the Constitution, the Constitution 
prevailed by the narrowest of margins.
CHAPTER 2
CONSTITUTIONAL GRANTS OF POWER
The Framers were acutely aware of the perils of 
concentrating the power over war. After much discussion, 
consequently, they decided to shackle the "dog of war" by 
providing that war powers would be both divided between and 
shared by the legislative and executive branches through 
several express constitutional provisions. This separation 
of powers, however, has generated enormous conflict over its 
proper exercise. In fact, within five years of the 
Constitution's ratification, prominent Framers James Madison 
and Alexander Hamilton were already arguing over whether the 
Constitution granted President George Washington the 
authority to issue a neutrality proclamation in the war 
between Britain and France.56 The discussion regarding the 
constitutionality of President Bush's actions in the Persian 
Gulf War is only a continuation of this historic debate.
56 Ralph A. Rossum and G. Alan Tarr, American
Constitutional Law. 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1991), p. 157.
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I. CONGRESSIONAL WAR POWERS
A. THE DECLARATION CLAUSE
Congress derives its war powers from several 
constitutional provisions. The most prominent grants 
Congress the authority to "declare war."57 Prior to 
drafting the Constitution in its final form, the Framers 
proposed various methods of going to war. Charles Pinckney 
and Alexander Hamilton suggested that the Senate be given 
the authority to make war. Edmund Randolph responded that 
the power would best be placed with the House of 
Representatives. Only Pierce Butler recommended that the 
warmaking power be given to the executive; however, his 
suggestion received no recorded support.58
In fact, after specifically discussing the potential 
problems of an excutive possessing power over war, the 
Framers deliberately chose to give this power to 
Congress.59 Thus, they initially agreed to give Congress 
the power to "make" war. James Madison and Elbridge Gerry 
later suggested this should be changed to "declare" war in
57 Article 1, section 8.
58 James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal
Convention of 178 7 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1966),
p. 476.
59 David Gray Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential 
Warmaking: The Enduring Debate," Political Science Quarterly
103 (Spring 1988), pp. 3-4.
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order to give the president authority to "repel sudden 
attacks. "60
Scholars differ on what the Framers intended "declare"
to mean. Shortly after the Constitution was drafted,
Alexander Hamilton explained the declaration clause and its
significance as follows:
The Congress shall have the power to declare war; the 
plain meaning of which is, that it is the peculiar and 
exclusive duty of Congress, when the nation is at 
peace, to change that state into a state of war; 
whether from calculations of policy, or from 
provocations or injuries received; in other words, it 
belongs to Congress only to go to war.61
Law professors Ann Thomas and A.J. Thomas define a
declaration of war as "simply a communication made by one
nation state to another that the status of peace. . . is now
terminated and a status of war has taken its place."62 In
a commonly used definition of the Framer's time, Emerich de
Vattel described war as "that state in which we prosecute
our rights by force."63 In Bas v. Tinav (1800), the
Supreme Court referred to war as a "contention by force
between two nations, in external matters, under the
authority of their respective governments."64 Legal
60 Madison, p. 476.
61 Quoted by Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr., 
The War-Making Powers of the President (Dallas: SMU Press,
1982), p. 37.
62 Ibid., p. 36.
63 Ibid., p. 39.
64 4 Dallas 37, 40 (U.S. 1800)
scholars such as David Gray Adler, Edwin Firmage, Francis 
Wormuth, and John Hart Ely maintain the term "declare" was 
well understood at the time of the Framers to be synonymous 
with commence.65 Firmage and Wormuth argue that 
contemporary usage shows the declaration clause "gave to 
Congress the exclusive right to initiate war."66 This 
interpretation coincides with James Madison's statement 
regarding the importance of separating war powers: "Those
who are to conduct a war . . . cannot in the nature of 
things, be the proper or safe judges whether a war ought to 
be commenced, continued or concluded. 1,67
Several constitutional experts such as Eugene Rostow 
and Terry Emerson argue that the change from "make" to 
"declare" lessened Congress' power. Rostow believes the 
term "declare" war refers only to the distinction between a 
state of war and peace at international law and using force 
during times of peace is part of the "sovereign right of 
self defense."68 Rostow quotes Professor Ratner who
65 Adler, p. 6; Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B.
Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War (Dallas: Southern Methodist
University Press, 1986), p. 20; John Hart Ely, "Suppose 
Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked," Columbia Law 
Review 88 (November 1988), p. 1379 n. 33.
66 Wormuth and Firmage, p. 21.
67 Quoted by Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional
Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1990), p. 83 (emphasis supplied).
68 Eugene V. Rostow, "Great Cases Make Bad Law: The
War Powers Act," in Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader.
2nd ed. eds. John H. Garvey and T. Alexander Aleinikoff (St.
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contends that the change from "make" to "declare" actually 
grants the president much more authority than simply to 
"repel sudden attacks." In a modern context, it "authorizes 
the president to protect Americans from external force in an 
emergency." This, concludes Ratner, indicates that 
"presidentially authorized hostilities are always ostensibly 
'defensive.'"69 Gordon Crovitz adds that the distinction 
between "declare" and "make" is of great significance as it 
allows for a broad range of presidential military activity 
without congressional authorization.70
The majority of constitutional scholars, on the other 
hand, maintain that substituting the word "declare" for 
"make" merely authorizes the president to defend the country 
against attack or "to have the direction of war when 
authorized or begun."71 The complete power to commence war 
remained vested in the legislature. As noted constitutional 
expert Edward Corwin explains: "It was clearly the original
understanding of the Constitution that under it all measures 
of hostility toward another government not justifiable 
immediately as acts of self-defense, have the sanction of
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1991), p. 216.
69 Ibid., p. 216.
70 Gordon L. Crovitz, "Micromanaging Foreign Policy," 
The Public Interest 100 (Summer 1990), p. 108.
71 Quoted by Charles A. Lofgren, Government from
Reflection and Choice (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986), p. 13.
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Congress."72 Law professors Edwin Firmage and Francis
Wormuth concur and explain that the motion's meaning was
clear. It left the power to initiate war with Congress
subject to "the reservation that the President need not
await authorization from Congress to repel a sudden attack
against the United States."73 Constitutional scholar John
Hart Ely similarly argues that the substitution of "declare"
for "make" was made:
to make clear that once hostilities were 
congressionally authorized, the President, as Commander 
in Chief, would assume tactical control. . . and to
preserve to the President the power, without advance 
congressional authorization, to respond defensively to 
"repel sudden attacks."74
After reviewing the comments of the Framers, presidential
scholar Arthur Schlesinger Jr. concludes that "no one wanted
either to deny the President the power to respond to
surprise attack or to give the President general power to
initiate hostilities."75
The argument that the change in this constitutional
provision did not divest Congress of any significant war
72 Quoted by Jeremy J. Stone, "Presidential First Use 
is Unlawful," Foreign Affairs 56 (Fall 1984), p. 105.
73 Wormuth and Firmage, p. 18. Louis Fisher adds that 
the power to repel sudden attacks is an emergency measure 
which does not authorize the President to "take the country 
into full-scale war or to mount an offensive attack against 
another nation." (Louis Fisher, "The Power of Commander in 
Chief" in The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, p. 48).
74 Ely, pp. 1387-88.
75 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), p. 4.
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power is supported by numerous statements by influential and
diverse members of the Constitutional Convention. Their
comments indicate that the Framers considered congressional
authority to declare war of vital importance to the
preservation of democracy. James Madison stated:
Every just view that can be taken of this subject 
admonishes the public of the necessity of a rigid 
adherence to the simple, the received and the 
fundamental doctrine of the Constitution, that the 
power to declare war is fully and exclusively vested in 
the legislature; that the executive has no right, in 
any case, to decide the question, whether there is or 
is not cause for declaring war; that the right of 
convening and informing Congress, whenever such a 
question seems to call for a decision, is all the right 
which the Constitution has deemed requisite and 
proper.76
James Wilson concurred:
This system will not hurry us into war, it is 
calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the 
power of a single man, or a single body of men, to 
involve us in such distress, for the important power of 
declaring war is vested in the legislature at large and 
this declaration must be made with the concurrence of 
the House of Representatives; from this circumstance we 
may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our 
national interest can draw us into a war.77
Because of their fear of the tyranny of a monarchy, it
is clear that the Framers wanted Congress alone to decide
76 Quoted by Glennon, "The Gulf War and the
Constitution," p. 87.
77 Quoted by The Gulf War Reader, p. 261.
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when war would be initiated.78 As Madison wrote to Thomas 
Jefferson:
The Constitution supposes what the history of all 
governments demonstrates, that the executive is the 
branch of power most interested in war, and most prone 
to it. It has accordingly, with studied care, vested 
the question of war in the legislature.79
Experience with the English king caused the Framers to fear
that the president might abuse a war power. George Mason
expressed this fear when he stated he was "against giving
the power of war to the Executive, because [he was] not to
be trusted with it."80 Gerry added that he "never expected
to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive
alone to declare war."81
The Framers' statements indicate they believed
Congress' power to declare war to be of great significance
and not simply a seldomly-used formality. The Framers
agreed that congressional participation would minimize the
dangers of precipitous military involvements and maximize
the requirements for deliberation and debate.
78 According to Charles Lofgren, state ratification
debates shed little additional light on this issue as the 
states were unconcerned with how the government would go to 
war (Lofgren, p. 16) . Only one of 77 proposed amendments 
dealt with Congress' power to go to war and this would have 
required a 2/3 vote of both houses to declare war (Ibid.).
79 Quoted by Glennon, "The Gulf War and the
Constitution," p. 87.
80 Fisher, "The Power of Commander in Chief," p. 48.
81 Ibid.
Although the right of Congress to formally declare war 
is rarely contested, the question of what type of military
activity constitutes war is the source of much debate. As
the Constitution only uses the word "war, 1 it is unclear 
from the declaration clause alone whether the Framers
intended it as a generic term to apply to all forms of
hostilities short of formal war or whether it left the 
commander-in-chief with the authority to initiate and 
participate in limited uses of force.82
Rostow, and other supporters of executive power, argue 
that under international law declarations of war are only 
required on the limited occasions when states "engage in 
unlimited general war."83 Terry Emerson adds that the 
Framers were aware declarations of war had already fallen 
into disuse and thus knew that Congress' declaration power 
would be limited to a small number of cases.84 
Representative Dick Cheney similarly maintains: "The
declaration of war is almost an outmoded concept under 
virtually any set of circumstances we can conceive of under
82 W. Michael Reisman, "War Powers: The Operational
Code of Competence," in Foreign Affairs and the U.S. 
Constitution. eds. Louis Henkin, Michael J. Glennon, and 
William D. Rogers (New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc.,
1990), p. 69.
83 Eugene V. Rostow, "President, Prime Minister or 
Constitutional Monarch, " American Journal of International 
Law 83 (October 1989), p. 744.
84 Terry J. Emerson, "Making War Without a Declaration," 
Journal of Legislation 17 (Winter 1990), pp. 29-30.
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which a president would decide to commit troops to 
combat. 1,85
However, to restrict Congress' power over war to the
extremely small number of cases in which a formal
declaration is issued appears inconsistent with the weight
the Framers gave this power and with their expressed
intention to curtail the president's ability to embroil the
nation in hostilities. It seems reasonable to conclude the
Framers intended that the declaration provision encompass
the power to initiate both total war and limited or
undeclared war. Otherwise, Congress could not effectively
check presidential military power and determine whether
armed intervention would be in the national interest. As
international legal scholar John Basset Moore explains:
There can hardly be room for doubt that the framers of 
the constitution, when they vested in Congress the 
power to declare war, never imagined that they were 
leaving it to the executive to use the military and 
naval forces of the United States all over the world 
for the purpose of actually coercing other nations, 
occupying their territory, and killing their soldiers 
and citizens, all according to his own notion or the 
fitness of things as long as he refrained from calling 
his action war or persisted in calling it peace.86
85 Quoted in War Powers and the Constitution
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1984), p. 3. 
During the Vietnam War, Under Secretary of State Nicholas 
Katzenbach similarly argued that Congress' authority to 
declare war was "outmoded phraseology." (quoted by John T. 
Rourke and Russell Farnen, "War, Presidents and the 
Constitution," Presidential Studies Quarterly 18 (Summer 
1988), p. 515).
Quoted by Wormuth and Firmage, p. 33.
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Early federal cases indicate that the courts also
believed Congress' authority over the initiation of military
conflict was complete. In 1782, the Federal Court of
Appeals explained that international law recognized two
types of war over which Congress had power:
The writers upon the law of nations, speaking of 
different kinds of war, distinguish them into perfect 
and imperfect: A perfect war is that which destroys
the national peace and tranquility, and lays the 
foundation for every possible act of hostility. The 
imperfect war is that which does not entirely destroy 
the public tranquility, but interrupts it only in some 
particulars, as in the case of reprisals.87
The U.S. Supreme Court similarly recognized in Talbot v.
Seeman (1801), 88 that Congress could authorize total war or
partial war.89 Chief Justice John Marshall added: "The
whole powers of war being, by the Constitution of the United
States, vested in Congress, the acts of that body alone be
87 Quoted by Adler, p. 7.
88 1 Cranch 1 (U.S. 1801) .
89 See also Bas v. Tingy. 4 Dallas 37 (1800), in which
the Supreme Court explained that "Congress is empowered to
declare a general war, or Congress may wage a limited war . .
II
In The Eliza. 11 S. Ct. 113 (1800), the Supreme Court
reiterated the differences between formal declared wars and 
imperfect wars:
If it be in declared form, it is called solemn, and 
is of the perfect kind; because one whole nation is 
at war with another whole nation . . . But
hostilities may subsist between two nations, more 
confined in its nature and extent; being limited as 
places, persons, and things; and this is more 
properly termed imperfect war; . . .(quoted in
Lehman, p . 57) .
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resorted to as our guides in the inquiry."90 In United 
States v. Smith (1806), Justice Patterson reiterated 
Congress' power: "Does he [the President] possess the power
of making war? That power is exclusively vested in Congress 
. 1191
After reviewing the historical evidence, legal scholar
Charles Lofgren concludes that the Framers intended
Congress' power to "commence war to be as broad as the
Confederate Congress" -- which was exclusive. He continues:
Since the old Congress held blanket power to 
"determine" on war, and since undeclared war was hardly 
unknown in fact and theory in the late eighteen 
century, it therefore seems a reasonable conclusion 
that the new Congress' power to declare war was not 
understood in a narrow technical sense but rather as 
meaning the power to commence war, whether declared or 
not.92
Political scientist Morton Halperin similarly argues that 
the declaration clause clearly signifies: "The president
may not introduce the United States into a military 
situation without the consent of Congress. This applies
90 1 Cranch 1, 24 (U.S. 1801) .
91 27 F.Cas. 1192, 1230 (No. 16342) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806),
quoted by David Gray Adler, "Foreign Policy and the Separation 
of Powers: The Influence of the Judiciary," in Judging the
Constitution. eds. Michael W. McCann and Gerald L. Houseman 
(Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1989), p. 157.
92 Lofgren, pp. 35-36. Douglas Steele adds that
evidence from the state ratification conventions "strongly 
suggests that the ratifiers believed the power to declare war 
in the Constitution to be virtually identical to the power of 
determining war contained in the Articles of Confederation." 
(Douglas L. Steele, "Covert Action and the War Powers 
Resolution," Syracuse Law Review 39 (1988), p. 1150).
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whether the war is declared or undeclared, whether it is
gradual or immediate, . . . .93
B. LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL
In addition to the power to declare war, Congress 
derives authority over military action from its 
constitutional power to "grant letters of marque and 
reprisal."94 From its origins in the Middle Ages, the 
practice of reprisals evolved into using public armies in 
limited ways.95 Although this term has fallen into disuse
today, numerous scholars argue that at the time of the
Framers the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal 
signified authority over hostilities short of war.96 
According to Halperin: "Congress' constitutional power to 
'grant letters of marque and reprisal' is the historical and 
legal equivalent of today's low-intensity conflict."97 
Special letters were granted by Congress "for the peacetime 
satisfaction of private claims."98 Peter Raven-Hansen
93 Morton H. Halperin, "Lawful Wars," Foreign Policy 72 
(Fall 1988), pp. 187-88.
94 Article I, section 8, clause 11.
95 Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking,"
p. 8.
96 Steele, p. 1152; Mark J. Yost, "Self Defense or 
Presidential Pretext? The Constitutionality of Unilateral 
Preemptive Military Action," Georgetown Law Journal 78 
(December 1989), p. 423; Schlesinger, p. 21.
97 Halperin, p. 188.
98 Lofgren, p. 31.
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adds: "Any power to commence undeclared war that was not
granted to Congress by the Declaration Clause was therfore 
arguably granted by the Marque and Reprisal Clause."99
The use of the term reprisal is consistent with the 
concept of limited wars. Hugo Grotius, a writer with whom 
the Framers were familiar, asserted that declared wars were 
perfect and undeclared wars were imperfect. He equated such 
imperfect wars with reprisals.100 Grotius' contemporary 
Jean Jacques Burlamaqui elaborated: "This last species of
war [undeclared or imperfect war] is generally called 
reprisals. . . "101 Lofgren argues that even if the Framers 
did not intend the declaration clause to be interpreted 
broadly, the addition of the authority to grant letters of 
marque and reprisal "conferred on Congress control over 
general reprisals outside the context of declared war. 1,102 
Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage similarly maintain that 
whatever powers were not covered directly under the 
declaration clause were "residual" in Congress' power to 
issue letters of marque and reprisal.103 Justice Joseph 
Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution concluded that
99 Peter Raven-Hansen, in The U.S. Constitution and the 
Power to Go to War, p. 31.
100 Lofgren, p. 27.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., p. 32.
103 Wormuth and Firmage, p. 179 n. 4.
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Congress was given the power over letters of marque and 
reprisal to remove doubts about legislative power to 
authorize undeclared hostilities.104
C. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
Another constitutional provision that grants Congress 
warmaking authority is the general responsibility conferred 
upon the legislative branch "to make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States, or in any Department or Officer Thereof."105 
Legal scholar Alexander Bickel maintains that this power 
encompasses the president and thus: "The implied powers of
the federal government, most of the unstated powers that 
inhere in nationhood, most everything that went without 
saying or that is residual--all that belongs to 
Congress."106 This enumeration grants Congress power to 
take measures short of war.107 Political scientist Jeremy 
Stone adds that the "necessary and proper" power coupled 
with Congress' war powers grant Congress the authority to
104 Quoted by Lofgren, p. 12.
105 Article 1, section 8.
106 Alexander M. Bickel, "Congress, the President and
the Power to Wage War," in Modern Constitutional Theory: A
Reader, p . 209.
107 Ibid., p. 212.
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conduct war in many respects.108 Terry Emerson warns, 
however, that this power "cannot be used as a guise for 
congressional measures stripping the Executive of its vested 
functions."109 Although Congress cannot use its authority 
under the necessary and proper clause to infringe on the 
president's express power, it can legislate on military 
affairs that are outside the president's authority.
It should additionally be remembered that Congress' war 
powers in Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution also 
consist of its authority to "raise and support Armies," "to 
provide and maintain a Navy," "to provide for calling forth 
the militia," and "to provide for the common defense."110
The Constitution grants only Congress the power to 
initiate war, both declared and undeclared. Determining 
what constitutes war within the meaning of the Constitution 
should be a question of substance not semantics. Experience 
has shown that if the president has the exclusive right to 
decide what type of military action constitutes war, he 
merely avoids using the title and thus justifies any type of 
unilateral military involvement. For example, when
108 Stone, p. 99.
109 Emerson, p. 31.
110 Legal Scholar William Van Alstyne argues that 
Congress' paramount war power is derived from its authority to 
determine whether the United States should even have an army 
or navy. (Charles Bennet et al., "The President's Powers as 
Commander-in-Chief Versus Congress' War Power and 
Appropriations Power," University of Miami Law Review 43 
(September 1988), pp. 26-28.
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President Harry Truman sent troops to South Korea to stop 
the North Korean offensive in 1950, he referred to the 
situation as a "police action" rather than a war. This 
semantical sleight-of-hand was followed by President Lyndon 
Johnson in Vietnam, President Ronald Reagan in Grenada, and 
President Bush in Panama and the Persian Gulf. Practical 
factors such as the number of troops deployed and the length 
and danger of the engagement should be obvious 
considerations. For example, deploying 12 0 0 marines to 
facilitate the PLO evacuation does not clearly invoke the 
specter of war. On the other hand, sending 25,000 troops to 
Panama to capture President Manuel Noriega leads one to the 
opposite conclusion. More specifically, deploying over 
400,000 troops to the Persian Gulf who are threatened with 
imminent attack by the Iraqi army even more obviously 
presents a war-like situation that requires congressional 
approval.
Clearly President Bush should have, and did eventually, 
receive congressional authorization prior to commencing 
offensive action against Iraq. However, a more 
controversial question concerns whether the President should 
have received congressional approval at an earlier date.
When troops were initially deployed, Saudi Arabia 
immediately needed American military assistance to fend off 
an anticipated Iraqi offensive. There was little time for 
congressional debate and the President arguably acted
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appropriately. Furthermore, he indicated that American 
troops were engaged in a strictly defensive operation which 
Congress sanctioned by resolution in October. However, the 
President should have requested congressional authorization 
prior to doubling the number of troops and publicly 
endorsing an offensive option. Several months had elapsed 
since the invasion. Congress had time to debate and 
determine the appropriateness of offensive action before 
additional troops were committed and Congress was presented 
with a fait accompli. It is ironic that the Bush 
Administration went to such great lengths to marshall 
international consensus on war while ignoring its 
responsibility to seek the even more critical approval of 
the U.S. Congress.
The deployment of over 400,000 troops, coupled with the 
President's threats of force, escalated the situation into a 
de facto war. The Constitution requires that Congress alone 
determine whether the U.S. should be engaged in such large- 
scale military operations.
II. PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS
A. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
The president derives his war power from several 
clauses in the Constitution. The most prominent states that 
the president is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and
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Navy of the United States."111 As a practical matter, this 
power confers upon the president virtual autonomy over a 
broad range of military activities during times of peace and 
control over hostilities once war is declared. Since the 
time of President Truman, presidents have invoked their 
authority as commander-in-chief to justify unilateral 
military activity without the prior approval of Congress. 
President Bush, for example, maintained that he could deploy 
troops to Saudi Arabia pursuant to his power as commander- 
in-chief .
Although the executive branch interprets the commander- 
in-chief clause broadly,112 legal scholars differ on 
whether the clause grants the president authority over all 
military conflicts short of total war or whether it merely 
designates the president as commander of U.S. forces once 
Congress has chosen to become involved militarily. Justice
111 Article II, section 2, cl. 1.
112 In an argument very similar to the ones made by the 
executive department prior to the Persian Gulf War, the State 
Department under President Johnson issued a bulletin 
supporting the President's actions in the Vietnam War by 
referring to his power as commander-in-chief:
Under the Constitution, the President, in addition to 
being Chief Executive, is Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy. He holds the prime responsibility for the 
conduct of the United States foreign relations. These 
duties carry very broad powers, including the power to 
deploy American forces abroad and commit them to military 
operations when the President deems such action necessary 
to maintain the security and defense of the United 
States. (quoted in David O'Brien, Constitutional Law and 
Politics. vol 1 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), p.
220 . )
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Robert Jackson insightfully remarked that the commander-in­
chief clause implies:
something more than an empty title. But just what 
authority goes with the name has plagued presidential 
advisors who would not waive or narrow it by non­
assertion yet cannot say where it begins or ends.113
Proponents of presidential power such as Eugene Rostow,
Gordon Crovitz, Geoffrey Miller, and Terry Emerson argue
that the commander-in-chief clause empowers the president to
take unilateral military activity in a wide range of
circumstances.114 The majority of constitutional
scholars, on the other hand, maintain that the commander-in-
chief provision is merely a military designation or title
that involves certain responsibilities--not a blanket grant
of military power. Louis Henkin argues: "There is no
evidence that the Framers contemplated any significant role-
-or authority--for the President as Commander in Chief when
there was no war."115 Edward Corwin adds that the
113 Quoted by Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts
between Congress and the President (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 285, quoting Youngstown 
Co. v. Sawver. 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952).
114 Bennett et al. , p. 32; Emerson, p. 28.
115 Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism. Democracy, and
Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990),
p. 25.
Wormuth and Firmage similarly argue that the president 
simply commands troops specifically designated by Congress and 
is subject to congressional limitations (Wormuth and Firmage, 
p. 121). William Van Alstyne concurs: "The President is
Commander-in-Chief only with regard to such armed forces as 
Congress provides, and such uses as Congress deems 
appropriate." (Bennett et al., p. 37).
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commander-in-chief clause was largely forgotten by early
presidents until President Abraham Lincoln transformed its
significance by using it to justify his broad use of war
powers during the Civil War.116 David Grey Adler concurs
and states that the president's designation as commander-in-
chief conferred no independent warmaking authority.117
Alexander Hamilton explained that the president's power
as commander-in-chief was necessarily limited by the
legislature's war powers:
. . . the President is to be Commander in Chief of the
army and navy of the United States. In this respect 
his authority would be nominally the same with that of 
the King of Great Britain, but in substance much 
inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than 
the supreme command and direction of the military and 
naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the 
confederacy; while that of the British King extends to 
the declaring of war and the raising and regulating of 
fleets and armies; all which by the
Constitution under consideration would appertain to the 
Legislature.118
After reviewing Hamilton's statement, Henkin argues:
"generals and admirals, even when they are 'first,' do not
determine the political purposes for which troops are to be
used; they command them in the execution of policy made by
116 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers.
4th ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1957) , p. 22 9.
117 Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential
Warmaking," p. 9.
118 Quoted in Jacob E. Cooke, ed. The Federalist
(Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), p. 465.
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others."119 Edwin Corwin agrees: "in any war in which the
United States becomes involved--one presumably declared by
Congress--the President will be top general and top admiral
of the forces provided by Congress."120 Law professor
Raoul Berger similarly notes that the commander-in-chief
clause only designated the president as first general of
American forces.121 According to Lofgren, the commander-
in-chief clause was passed without debate which indicates
that the military designation was commonly understood.122
The early Supreme Court similarly interpreted the
commander--in-chief clause as Justice Roger Taney explained
in Fleming v. Page (1850):
His (the president's) duty and his power are purely 
military. As commander-in-chief, he is authorized to 
direct the movements of the naval and military forces 
placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the 
manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer 
and subdue the enemy.123
The Framers viewed the commander-in-chief as subject to 
the will of Congress. The Continental Congress, for 
example, directed much of George Washington's military
119 Quoted by Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential 
Warmaking," p. 13.
120 Corwin, p. 229. Schlesinger similarly concludes: 
"There is no evidence that anyone supposed that his office as 
Commander in Chief endowed the President with an independent 
source of authority." (Schlesinger, p. 6).
121 Quoted by Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 82 
n. 66 .
122 Lofgren, p. 12.
9 Howard 603, 614 (U.S. 1850)
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activity in the Revolutionary War. In fact, Washington's
commission of June 19, 1775, stated that he should
. . . observe and follow such orders and directions
from time to time as you shall receive from this or a 
future congress of these United Colonies, or a 
committee of congress, for that purpose appointed.124
David Grey Adler reviews the role of commander-in-chief in
English history and concludes that he was always subject to
a political superior.125
Because the Framers did not want the executive to have
the power to initiate war, they expressly (and with much
discussion as to its significance) granted that power to
Congress. To interpret the commander-in-chief clause as a
grant of authority to the president to engage in military
activity, no matter how great its scope, undermines the
Framer's separation of powers and contravenes what appears
to have been the settled understanding of the term
commander-in-chief as a simple military title. Alexander
Hamilton explained that the president as commander-in-chief
was simply "to have the direction of the war once authorized
or begun."126
124 Stone, p. 97.
It should be noted that Louis Henkin faults reliance on 
George Washington's early role as commander-in-chief because 
it ignores later extensive delegations of power to General 
Washington and because it occurred prior to the creation of a 
separate and independent executive branch (Henkin, 
Constitutionalism. Democracy and Foreign Affairs, p. 286).
125 Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential
Warmaking," p. 9.
126 Ibid., p. 12.
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B . EXECUTIVE POWER
The president also claims that the Constitution grants 
him military authority as the holder of executive power.
This encompasses the responsibility to protect and insure 
the safety of citizens at home and abroad. Alexander 
Hamilton broadly construed presidential executive power and 
argued that it was only restricted by the enumerated 
constitutional authority of Congress.127 Crovitz concurs 
and argues that congressional grants of power in the 
Constitution are defined in limited terms while presidential 
powers are defined expansively.128 Eugene Rostow similarly 
maintains that the president's preeminent foreign affairs 
power is derived from his constitutional grant of executive 
power.129 Rostow warns that Congress is usurping the 
president's constitutional power over military operations 
which he characterizes as "matters of executive 
discretion. 1,130
127 Thomas and Thomas, p . 9 .
128 Crovitz, p. 107.
129 Quoted by Henkin, Glennon, and Rogers, p. 31.
130 Ibid., p. 32.
It is interesting to note that Gordon Crovitz and Eugene 
Rostow refer to Congress as imperial and argue that it is 
Congress who is now attempting to infringe on the president's 
constitutional powers. On the other hand, the majority of 
scholars contend the opposite--that the president has become 
imperial and has augmented his authority over war at the 
expense of Congress. (Rourke and Farnen, p. 513; Yost, p. 415; 
Steele, p. 1142) .
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On the other hand, James Madison viewed executive power
as narrowly limited to explicit grants of power in the
Constitution. Adler and Berger explain that the Framers
discussed executive power and explicitly agreed that it
should not extend to powers of peace and war.131 Moreover,
the president cannot execute what Congress has not first
legislated. Bickel underscores that the president requires
legislation to implement his powers:
Whatever is needed to flesh out the slender recital of 
Executive functions must be done by Congress under the 
"necessary and proper" clause. Congress alone can make 
the laws which will carry into execution the powers of 
the Government as a whole, and of its officers, 
including the President.132
James Madison similarly stated: "The natural providence of
the executive magistrate is to execute the laws as that of
the legislature is to make laws. All his acts, therefore,
properly executive, must presuppose the existence of the
laws to be executed. 1,133
131 Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential 
Warmaking," pp. 14-15; Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 
82 n. 6 6 .
When the creation of the national executive branch 
was discussed at the Constitutional Convention and it was 
proposed that the branch be granted the executive power of the 
Continental Congress, Charles Pinckney worried that "the 
Executive powers of (the existing Continental) Congress might 
extend to peace and war which would render the Executive a 
Monarchy of the worst kind, towit an elective one." James 
Madison and James Wilson reassured Pickney that making peace 
and war were legislative matters. (quoted by Wormuth and 
Firmage, pp. 17-18) .
132 Quoted by Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 73.
Quoted by Wormuth and Firmage, p. 16.
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Even if the president does have broad executive powers 
in domestic affairs, the Constitution expressly grants 
Congress authority to initiate hostilities. The president's 
executive powers, then, are terminated where express 
constitutional provisions regarding war begin.134
Presidents have also argued that their foreign affairs 
power authorizes the utilization of forces and arms abroad 
in international conflicts as an instrument of foreign 
policy.135 The president's foreign affairs authority is 
derived from his executive power, treaty making power, and 
power to receive ambassadors.136 In an often cited case on 
the president's preeminent role in foreign affairs, United 
States v. Curtiss-Wriaht Export Corporation (1936) , Justice 
George Sutherland ruled that Congress could delegate
134 Yost, p. 421 n. 33.
135 While campaigning for president in 1988 before an
American Legion Convention, George Bush faulted Congress for
usurping presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs and 
pledged to redress the perceived imbalance:
What kind of wacky world is this where the 
President is taken to court every time he moves our 
troops around in the national interest? Sometimes 
a president must take risks for peace, and he
doesn't need to be blocked every step of the way 
(quoted by Crovitz, p. 103) .
136 Contrary to presidential claims of plenary power 
over foreign relations, several constitutional scholars argue 
that the Framers intended Congress to have primary
responsibility in international affairs (Wormuth and Firmage, 
p. 177).
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authority to the President to embargo the sale of arms to
Paraguay and Bolivia.137 Sutherland stated:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here 
dealing not alone with an authority vested in the 
President by an exertion of legislative power, but with 
such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and 
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of 
the federal government in the field of international 
relations.138
The Court's ruling in Curtiss-Wright has been criticized on 
numerous grounds. Most legal experts argue that 
Sutherland's reference to the president as the "sole organ" 
of foreign policy is merely unnecessary dicta and thus not 
binding.139 Several authors also note that Sutherland's 
use of former Representative John Marshall's "sole organ" 
statement was misplaced as Marshall was only referring to 
the president's role as exclusive communicator with other 
governments.140 There has also been disagreement on 
whether this case directly applies to war powers 
controversies.
After reviewing and faulting the Court's reasoning in 
Curtiss-Wriqht. Lofgren concludes that although the case 
does not limit Congress' authority to declare war as the 
Court recognized limitations on the president's use of
137 2 9 9 U.S. 304 (U.S. 1936).
138 Ibid., pp. 319-20.
139 Ibid., p. 20; Wormuth and Firmage, p. 181 n. 7.
140 Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 24; Wormuth 
and Firmage, pp. 181-82.
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external powers, the ruling does "implicitly support 
executive authority to use the armed forces in implementing 
foreign policy objectives."141
On the other hand, Bickel argues that the holding in 
Curtiss-Wright is limited to the facts in that case and does 
not extend to war powers because the Court stated that 
presidential powers "must be exercised in subordination to 
the applicable provisions of the Constitution."142 Bickel 
adds that the case says "nothing about the powers to go to 
war or to use the armed forces without restriction."143 
After criticizing Justice Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss- 
Wright. Adler quotes Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. who similarly 
contended:
The case itself involved the power to act under 
congressional authorization, not the power to act 
independently of Congress. Moreover, it involved the 
power over foreign commerce, not the power over 
war.144
It is illuminating to contrast the judicially created 
"sole organ" doctrine with Alexander Hamilton's specific 
reference to foreign policy in Federalist 75:
141 Lofgren, p. 2 04.
142 Bickel, p. 211.
143 Ibid.
144 Quoted by Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential 
Warmaking," p. 32.
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The history of human conduct does not warrant that 
exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it 
wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate a 
momentous a kind, as those which concern its 
intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole 
disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as 
would be the president of the United States.145
Although the president does have broad foreign policy
powers, he is far from the "sole organ" in international
affairs. Congress has been given an explicit constitutional
role in several critical areas of foreign policy: Congress
regulates commerce between the U.S. and other nations; the
Senate has treaty ratification powers; and Congress has
significant war powers. While the president should have
some flexibility to use the military to protect and promote
American interests abroad, this power is necessarily limited
by certain enumerated grants of authority to Congress.
Political and military decisions regarding America's
national interests abroad should not be made by the
commander-in-chief alone, but should emerge (as the Framers
intended) from a dialogue between the executive and
legislative branches. While the president may have the
authority to deploy limited numbers of troops
internationally, he cannot take action that, as a practical
matter, constitutes war. In other words, the president's
right to use gun boat diplomacy depends on the size of the
boat.
Quoted in Cooke, pp. 5 05-06.
C . CONSTITUTIONAL CUSTOM
President Bush, like other presidents before him, also 
argued that the repeated historic practice of international 
presidential military actions created a precedent providing 
authority for his prosecution of the Persian Gulf Crisis.
The President stated: "history is replete with examples
where the President has had to take action. 1,146 The 
executive branch emphasized that American presidents had 
used the armed forces abroad more than 200 times. However, 
a closer examination of history supports the Framers' more 
conservative view of presidential power.
Early American presidents were especially deferential 
of the war powers of Congress. America's quasi-war with 
France in 1798, although not preceded by a declaration of 
war, was debated by Congress and authorized through a series 
of legislation.147 In his first message to Congress in 
1801, President Jefferson requested guidance from Congress 
in dealing with threats against American ships from the 
Pasha of Tripoli. Jefferson stated that he was 
"unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of 
Congress, to go beyond the line of defense;" Congress must 
authorize "measures of offense also."148 President Andrew 
Jackson similarly viewed his war-making powers as limited by
146 Hansen, p. 29.
147 Fisher, "The Power of Commander in Chief," p. 49.
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Congress. He refused to recognize Texas and referred the 
issue to Congress as a question "probably leading to war" 
and thus a subject for "that body by whom war can alone be 
declared. 1,149
When President James Polk ordered the army to occupy 
disputed territory with Mexico in 1846 and started the 
Mexican American War, he was censured by the House.
President Lincoln did take unilateral military action during 
the Civil War; however, his actions were later upheld by the 
Supreme Court as defensive.150 The Court explained that 
the President was "bound to resist force by force. He does 
not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge 
without waiting for any legislative authority. 1,151 The 
next three major conflicts: the Spanish American War of
1898, World War I, and World War II, were all formally 
declared by Congress.
President Truman's unilateral deployment of troops to 
Korea in 1950 signaled a new era of presidential military
149 Quoted by Schlesinger, p. 29.
150 Ironically enough, while a congressperson Lincoln was 
an eloquent critic of Polk's actions. When asked whether Polk 
should have been allowed to determine if an invasion of Mexico 
was necessary, Lincoln famously responded:
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, 
whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion 
. . . and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study
to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this 
respect. (Ibid., p. 42).
151 Ibid. , p . 51.
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committments abroad.152 The Korean War was not explicitly- 
authorized by Congress. The Vietnam War, although initially 
sanctioned by Congress through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
in 1964, was later repudiated by Congress through the repeal 
of that Resolution and other express legislation curtailing 
military appropriations. With the exception of Korea and 
Vietnam nearly all the other examples of presidental 
military activity cited by the executive branch as 
precedents were minor incidents involving small numbers of 
troops and material. With the exception of Korea, no other 
presidential unilateral military committment approached the 
scale of the Persian Gulf War.
The Supreme Court first introduced the idea of 
constitutional custom in Stuart v. Laird (1803). There the 
Court held that where the interpretation of a constitutional 
clause is doubtful, practice and acquiescence over years can 
fix construction.153 In a separate opinion in the Steele 
Seizure Case. Justice Felix Frankfurter elaborated on the 
doctrine of "quasi-constitutional custom:"
152 President Dwight Eisenhower, however, faulted 
Truman's unilateral exercise of military force in Korea. As 
president, he requested congressional authority to act in the 
Middle East and the Straits of Formosa. (Fisher, "Historical 
Survey," pp. 22-23).
153 1 Cranch 298 (U.S. 1803) .
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systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued 
to the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned. . . making it as it were such an exercize
of power part of the structure of government, may be 
treated as a gloss on 'executive power' vested in the 
President by section 1 of Article II.154
Prior presidential uses of military force without sanction
of Congress do not meet these requirements. As previously
mentioned, they were largely minor actions. Moreover, many
of the instances cited by the executive were actually
legimized or authorized by Congress through affirmative
legislation. Finally, Congress has repeatedly questioned
the executive branch's post-Korean War assertion that the
president is authorized to initiate military action without
the approval of Congress. It did so in Vietnam when the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was repealed. It did so in 1973
when the War Powers Resolution, a congressional attempt to
restrict presidential war powers, was passed. It did so in
1982 when the requirements of the War Powers Resolution were
imposed upon President Reagan's deployment of Marines in
Lebanon. And it did so when Congress debated and passed the
Resolution authorizing President Bush to use force in the
Persian Gulf.
After discussing the list of presidential uses of power 
abroad in detail and concluding that the majority were 
trivial actions, Firmage and Wormuth argue that the "quasi-
154 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 72 S.Ct. 863 , 
897 (U.S. 1952) .
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constitutional custom" doctrine does not apply. They 
explain:
In the case of executive wars, none of the conditions 
for the establishment of constitutional power by usage 
is present. The Constitutional is not ambiguous. No 
contemporaneous congressional interpretation attrubutes 
a power of initiating war to the President. The early 
Presidents, and indeed everyone in the country until 
the year 1950, denied that the President possessed such 
a power. There is no sustained body of usage to 
support such a claim.155
Even if prior examples of presidential uses of force 
abroad had been substantially similar to the Persian Gulf 
War and met the factual requirements of the "quasi- 
constitutional custom" doctrine, they would still constitute 
an unconstitutional expansion of executive power. 
Unconstitutional actions cannot change the meaning of the 
Constitution.156 Moreover, the president should not be 
allowed to augment his power through continuous 
usurpation.157
III. CONCLUSION
The Persian Gulf War is a classic example of 
presidential military action which clearly exceeds 
constitutional boundaries. The Persian Gulf deployment 
occurred on a massive scale over a period of months.
Congress should have and could have been meaningfully
155 Firmage and Wormuth, p. 149.
156 John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 9.
157 Firmage and Wormuth, p. 13 6.
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consulted. If a national consensus for war did not exist in 
November, President Bush should not have committed to it 
publicly. The Constitution requires more.
CHAPTER 3
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
I . INTRODUCTION
The constitutional debate regarding the appropriate 
separation of war powers between Congress and the president 
reached its zenith in 1973 when Congress adopted the War 
Powers Resolution (WPR) over President Richard Nixon's veto. 
Enacted largely as a response to unilateral presidential 
military activity in Vietnam, the WPR attempts to restrict 
the president's power to intervene militarily in hostile 
situations and also seeks to define Congress' role in 
determining when and how American forces will be engaged.
Since 1973, legislators have repeatedly raised the 
requirements of the WPR as a basis for asserting that the 
president should discuss and receive authorization for 
large-scale troop deployments. However, every president 
since the Resolution's enactment has refused to recognize 
the its constitutionality and meaningfully comply with its 
provisions. Proponents of the WPR assert that it is a 
necessary measure to curb executive military excesses and to 
return to the separation of war powers outlined in the
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Constitution. The Resolution's critics contend that it 
unconstitutionally restrains the president from exercising 
his powers as commander-in-chief and head of foreign policy. 
Both supporters and critics of the Resolution concur that it 
has not functioned as intended and should be amended.
President Bush's broad assertion of war powers renewed 
debate on this controversial resolution. Although the 
President stated that his initial report was "consistent 
with" the WPR, he later ignored its provisions. Congress, 
on the other hand, repeatedly referred to the Resolution in 
legislation relating to the Gulf War. In fact, after the 
use of force resolution was adopted in early January, House 
Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Dante Fascell stated that 
the WPR was functioning--the President had filed a WPR 
report, Congress debated, and legislation was passed 
providing authorization pursuant to the Resolution.
Faschell optimistically concluded: "the War Powers
Resolution is alive and well."158 Considering the 
President's evasion of the WPR and Congress' unwillingness 
to impose its requirements, Faschell's optimism was somewhat 
misplaced.
158 Ellen C. Collier, "Statutory Constraints: The War
Powers Resolution, " in The Constitution and the Power to Go to 
War, p. 24.
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II. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
A. BACKGROUND
President Nixon's continuation of the Vietnam War 
despite congressional disapproval illustrated the practical 
difficulties Congress experienced playing a role in modern 
military conflicts. Therefore, Congress outlined and 
codified what it perceived its war making authority to be in 
the WPR. According to political scientist James Nathan, 
three political assumptions underlay the adoption of the 
WPR:
(1) that U.S. armed forces should not enter hostilities 
without adequate domestic support, (2) that only a 
compelling national interest should dictate a 
commitment of troops, and (3) that the Congress 
provided a kind of "reality test" for the President in 
these matters.159
Drafters of the WPR recognized that Congress has
historically attempted to avoid the politically troublesome
issues of war and peace. They hoped the Resolution would
require legislative action where Congress had previously
chosen to remain silent.160 The WPR was also passed
because Congress acknowledged its inability to act quickly
and desired a mechanism to expedite debate.161
159 Nathan, "Curbing the Distress of War: An Outline
for a War Powers Resolution that Works," p. 60 9.
160 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers
Resolution that Worked," p. 1415, n. 12.
161 John Spanier and Joseph Nogee, eds. , Congress. The 
Presidency and American Foreign Policy (New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1981), p. xxvi.
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Interestingly enough, the WPR has divided both liberals 
and conservatives. It was opposed by a unique alliance of 
liberals who thought it gave the president too much power 
and conservatives who believed it infringed on the 
president's authority as commander-in-chief .162 It was 
supported by those who argued that the president had 
exceeded his constitutional authority and usurped 
congressional power to decide when hostilities should be 
initiated.
B . TEXT
The text of the Resolution is illustrative of its 
potential as a procedural device for delineating war powers 
and also its constitutional and practical problems. The 
Resolution's express purpose as explained in Section 2(a) is 
to:
(E)nsure that the collective judgment of both the 
Congress and the President will apply to the 
introduction of United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities, or into situations where imminent 
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces 
in hostilities or in such situations.163
Section 2(c) states that executive power as commander-in-
chief to deploy forces into hostilities or areas of imminent
hostilities is limited to: "1) a declaration of war, 2)
162 Stuart W. Darling, "Rethinking the War Powers Act," 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 7 (Spring/Summer 1977), p. 127.
163 The WPR is codified in 50 U.S.C. ss. 1541-1548
(1982) .
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specific statutory authorization, 3) a national emergency
created by attack upon the United States" or its forces or
territories abroad. Section 3 provides:
The President in every possible instance shall consult 
with Congress before introducing United States Armed 
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstances, and after every such 
introduction shall consult regularly with Congress . .
Sections 2 and 3 are in the "Purpose and Policy" portion of
the Resolution and as such are not considered binding.
Section 4 (a) requires the president to report to
Congress within 48 hours of the introduction of military
forces into a number of circumstances including situations
of imminent hostilities (section 4(a)(1)). Section 5(b)
states that when a section 4(a)(1) report of imminent
hostilities is required by military commitments, the
president shall terminate the use of armed forces within 6 0
days unless Congress has declared war or specifically
authorized a continued use of force by statute. This
section further provides that Congress can extend the 6 0 day
limit for no more than 3 0 days or that Congress may require
the removal of troops by concurrent resolution (not subject
to presidential veto) prior to the expiration of 60 days.
Sections 6 and 7 discuss expedited procedures for joint and
concurrent resolutions.
Section 8(a) explains that authority to commit troops
shall not be inferred from any provision that does not
specifically refer to the War Powers Resolution. The
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section additionally states that "nothing in this joint 
resolution . . .  is intended to alter the constitutional 
authority of the Congress or the President. . ." Section 9
contains a provision stating that if any section of the 
Resolution is found to be unconstitutional the rest of the 
Resolution is severable and will remain valid.
This controversial Resolution has been vigorously 
attacked on a variety of grounds and has never functioned as 
its drafters intended.
C . PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE
The WPR played a significant role in the debate during 
the Persian Gulf Crisis. As Chapter 1 indicated, Congress 
repeatedly raised its requirements to pressure President 
Bush into obtaining authorization prior to taking offensive 
action. Except for describing his notification to Congress 
of the initial troop deployment in August as "consistent 
with" the WPR, President Bush virtually ignored its 
provisions. The President never conceded that the 60 day 
time period had commenced nor did he refer to the Resolution 
when he notified Congress in November 1991 that troop 
strength would be doubled.
The text of the WPR indicates that it should have 
applied to the Persian Gulf crisis in three ways. First, 
President Bush should have consulted with Congress prior to 
deploying additional troops after the initial emergency 
expired. Second, he should have fully informed Congress
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within 4 8 hours of the troop commitment and the 6 0 day time 
clock should have been triggered. Third, within the 60 day 
period Congress should have determined whether the U.S. 
forces would take an offensive or defensive posture.164
President Bush's evasion of the WPR was not novel. 
Although 2 5 reports have been issued by the executive since 
19 7 3 , 165 nearly all have simply declared themselves 
"consistent with" the WPR. This term has been used by 
presidents in order to placate Congress without explicitly 
recognizing the Resolution's constitutionality. A section 
4(a)(1) report of hostilities was filed in 1975 by President 
Gerald Ford regarding the Mayaguez rescue mission. However, 
the mission was completed by the time the report was filed. 
In countless other instances since 1973, presidents have 
used force abroad without filing any report.
Congress has only formally invoked the WPR once. When 
President Reagan initially deployed 12 0 0 marines on a 
peacekeeping mission to Lebanon in September 1982, he 
refused to submit a section 4(a)(1) hostilities report. As 
the Lebanese situation deteriorated and several marines were 
killed, Congress threatened to commence the 60 day time 
period and force a troop withdrawal. After President Reagan 
and Congress negotiated, the President agreed to sign a
164 Edwin B. Firmage, "The War Power of Congress and
Revision of the War Powers Resolution," Journal of
Contemporary Law 17 (1991), p. 255.
165 Collier, p. 55.
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resolution acknowledging imminent hostilities in exchange 
for authorization to extend the marines' mission by 18 
months.
It appeared initially that President Bill Clinton might 
explicitly recognize the legality of the WPA and forge a 
more open foreign policy relationship with a Congress 
controlled by his own party. He consulted extensively with 
Congress to formulate his policy toward Haiti during his 
first year in office. Subsequently, however, he sent cruise 
missiles to Iraq without meaningfully consulting with 
Congress. When he notified Congress of the attack, he 
called his report "consistent with" the WPR.166
President Clinton evoked his evasive Republican 
predecessors by virtually ignoring Congress in the fall of 
1994. He publicly announced the U.S. would invade Haiti on 
September 18 without consulting Congress or receiving 
authorization as required by the WPR. Although the invasion 
was aborted by last-minute diplomacy, Haiti's military 
leaders did not agree to leave until the first American 
planes had actually been launched.167 Congress, the 
majority of whom opposed President Clinton's Haiti policy, 
debated the issue along largely partisan lines. Republicans
166 Gregory J. Bowens, "Iraq: Bombing, Widely Backed on
Hill, Reopens War Powers Debate," Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report 51 (July 3, 1993), p. 1750.
167 George Church, "Destination Haiti, " Time (September 
26, 1994), p. 23.
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who had supported President Bush in Panama and the Persian 
Gulf, now argued that the Constitution and the WPR required 
the President to consult with Congress prior to invading 
Haiti. Democratic legislators responded that the proposed 
Haitan invasion was a much smaller operation than the two 
previous actions.168
Although Congress itself has consistently found the WPR 
unworkable, few legislators want to concede the law is 
invalid.169 It has been raised, perhaps effectively, as a 
threat to force President Clinton to discuss military 
peacekeeping missions with Congress.170 Legislation 
authorizing presidential military activity continues to 
refer to the WPR.171
III. THE DEBATE
The difficulty of reviewing the WPR is that there are 
as many opinions regarding the Resolution as there are
168 Ibid., p. 26.
169 Carroll J. Doherty, "On Somalia, War Powers Law 
Becomes a GOP Weapon," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 
51 (October 30, 1993), p. 2987.
170 The House referred to the Resolution in H.Con.Res. 
170 which sought to require the President to remove troops 
from Somalia prior to his March deadline. The resolution 
failed in the Foreign Affairs Committee by only one vote. 
(Carroll J. Doherty, "A Close Vote on War Powers," 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 51 (November 6, 1993), 
p. 3060) .
171 Gregory J. Bowens, "Resolution Would OK Troops to 
Operate under U.N.," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 51 
(May 22, 1993), p. 1304.
authors who have discussed its provisions. The WPR has been 
variously described as: "an abysmal failure; 1,172 "deeply
flawed;"173 "unconstitutional, ineffective, and 
unwise;"174 a "useful congressional negotiating tool;"175 
"plainly constitutional;176 and finally, as "just another 
element in the political struggle between the branches."177
The complexity of the debate is complicated by the fact 
that political scientists and legal scholars approach the 
WPR differently. Political scientists generally focus on 
whether or not the legislation constitutes good policy.
Legal scholars discuss its constitutionality and propose 
specific legislative modifications. Opponents articulately 
challenge the Resolution as both unconstitutional and bad
172 John W. Rolph, "The Decline and Fall of the War 
Powers Resolution: Waging War under the Constitution after
Desert Storm," Mercer Law Review 43 (Winter 1992), p. 646.
173 Firmage, p. 23 7.
174 Quoted by John C. Cruden, Review of The War Powers
Resolution: Its Implementation in Theory and Practice, by
Robert Turner, Virginia Journal of International Law 24 
(Winter 1984), p. 514.
175 Donna Haynes Henry, "The War Powers Resolution: A 
Tool for Balancing Power Through Negotiation, " Virginia Law 
Review 70 (June 1984), p. 1054.
176 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that 
Worked," p. 13 86.
177 "Realism, Liberalism and the War Powers Resolution, "
Harvard Law Review 102 (January 1989), p. 638.
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policy while equally eloquent proponents defend it on both 
grounds.
A. OPPONENTS
1. CONSTITUTIONALITY
The most common criticism of the WPR is that it is 
unconstitutional. The executive branch has consistently 
opposed the Resolution and never meaningfully complied with 
its requirements. No president has ever formally consulted 
with Congress prior to committing troops.178 Moreover, 
every president since the Resolution was passed has 
contended that it unconstitutionally undermines his power as 
commander-in-chief and chief executive.
Law professors Philip Trimble and Geoffrey Miller state 
that the Resolution is unconstitutional because the 
president's constitutional powers can be regulated only by 
specific congressional legislation.179 Congress cannot 
limit presidential action in advance through broadly phrased 
general restrictions.180 A different constitutional 
criticism is levied by former cabinet member and ambassador 
Elliott Richardson. He believes the Resolution undermines
178 Joshua Lee Prober, "Congress, the War Powers
Resolution, and the Secret Political Life of a 'Dead Letter,'" 
Journal of Law and Politics 7 (Fall 1990), p. 177.
179 Quoted in "War Powers and the Responsibility of
Congress," Proceedings of the 82nd Annual Meeting, American
Society of International Law 82 (1988), p. 10.
Charles Bennett et al., p. 32.
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the system of checks and balances by attempting to delineate 
constitutional powers and eliminate the institutional 
competition and compromise the Founders intended.181
Opponents of the Resolution further fault the 
enumeration of presidential powers in section 2 as 
unconstitutionally underinclusive. They argue that the 
president does not derive all his constitutional war powers 
from the commander-in-chief clause and that he can introduce 
troops pursuant to his power: to execute commitments under
security treaties, to act as the sole voice in foreign 
policy, and to act as the nation's chief executive.182 
Legal scholars Ann and A.J. Thomas more specifically 
criticize section 8(a)(2) which states that presidential 
authority to use force should not be inferred from treaty 
commitments. They argue that this provision is 
unconstitutional because treaties, such as our security 
alliance with NATO, are the supreme law of the land and the 
president has a constitutional duty to see that they are 
faithfully executed.103
181 Elliott L. Richardson, "Checks and Balances in 
Foreign Relations," American Journal of International Law 83 
(October 1989), p. 738.
182 Thomas and Thomas, p. 133.
183 Ibid., p. 137. Senator Javits responds that
international treaties specify they will be carried out in 
accordance with the "constitutional processes of the nations 
involved" and the WPR merely defines those processes. (Jacob 
K. Javits, Who Makes War (New York: William Morrow & Co.,
1973), p. 268).
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Critics also assert that presidents have historically 
committed armed forces in hostile situations and this has 
set a precedent that the WPR cannot change.184 Eugene 
Rostow, a prominent proponent of executive power, affirms 
that the president has often taken military action without 
consulting Congress and this has created a practice which 
gives meaning to the Constitution.185 A leading State 
Department critic of the WPR, Abraham Sofaer, notes the 
extensive number of presidential uses of force without 
congressional authorization and concludes that the president 
has "ample authority under the Constitution" to act 
militarily without specific legislative authority.186
2. POLICY
After reviewing the Resolution's constitutional 
failings, opponents further assert that it constitutes bad
1 Senator Tom Eagleton refers to this argument as the 
"bank robber theory," e.g. if numerous bank robberies were 
successful, the act of robbing banks should be legalized. 
(Thomas F. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power (New York: 
Liveright, 1974), p. 125).
Senator Brock Adams adds that even if a precedent was 
established, it was negated by passage of the WPR. (quoted in 
"War Powers and the Responsibility of Congress," p. 3).
Michael Glennon reviews the enumeration of unilateral 
presidential actions and concludes that the vast majority were 
minor instances which do not justify presidential claims of 
augmented military authority. (Glennon, "The Gulf War and the 
Constitution," pp. 89-90).
185 Rostow, "President, Prime Minister or Constitutional 
Monarch," p. 744.
186 Abraham D. Sofaer, "The War Powers Resolution: 
Fifteen Years Later," Temple Law Review 62 (Spring 1989), p. 
321.
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policy. Legal advisor Terry Emerson believes that the WPR 
precipitates a vote over military action before reasoned and 
deliberative judgment can occur.187 Sofaer adds that the 
WPR "will lead to unnecessary and undesirable legal faceoffs 
between Congress and the President, when the nation most 
needs to implement foreign policy effectively and 
wisely."188 Thus, the Resolution transforms what should be 
a political debate into a legal debate.189
Opponents further assert that the Resolution 
excessively limits presidential power over foreign affairs. 
Emerson contends that the Resolution is "dangerous to the 
country's safety because it denies flexibility to the 
President in the conduct of foreign relations and conveys a 
message of political disunity in the American 
Government."190 Ann and A.J. Thomas concur and maintain 
that the WPR detrimentally removes the threat of 
presidential use of force in his dealings with other 
nations.191 The Resolution's critics argue that the 
president must be able to act quickly to prevent global
187 Emerson, p. 31.
188 Sofaer, p. 317.
189 Military law professor John Rolph similarly
criticizes the WPR for fostering detailed constitutional and 
legal arguments rather than a discussion of the political 
merits of the president's proposed military policy. (Rolph, p. 
650) .
190 Emerson, p. 51.
191 Thomas and Thomas, p. 138.
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crises and protect American interests and citizens 
abroad.192 They also point out the need for secrecy in any 
military situation and claim that consulting with Congress 
prior to troop deployments may compromise the security of 
American forces.
Liberal commentators criticize the Resolution for 
dramatically different reasons. For example, Senator 
Eagleton (one of the authors of the Senate version of the 
Resolution) and Representative Charles Bennett argue that 
the modified Resolution passed by both Houses granted the 
president excessive power because it does not require 
congressional approval prior to troop commitments, and then 
grants him 60 days to act unilaterally.193 Law professor 
Edwin Firmage adds that the Resolution is "deeply flawed" 
for two reasons. First, if the president rapidly concludes 
any military deployment it would be difficult for Congress 
to challenge his action. Second, once troops are deployed 
it becomes difficult for Congress to oppose the president 
and remove the troops.194
192 President Nixon specifically addressed this concern 
in his veto message to the House. He stated that the effect 
of the WPR would be to "seriously undermine this Nation's 
ability to act decisively and convincingly in times of 
international crisis." (quoted by William P. Agee, "The War 
Powers Resolution: Congress Seeks to Reassert Its 
Constitutional Role as a Partner in War Making," Rutgers Law 
Journal 18 (Winter 1987), p. 405).
193 Bennett et al. , p. 31.
Firmage, p. 23 7.
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B . PROPONENTS
1. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Proponents of the War Powers Resolution counter that 
the President has preempted Congress in military affairs and 
violated the constitutional separation of powers. They 
assert that the Resolution is clearly constitutional as it 
encompasses the war powers of Congress. Senator Brock Adams 
explained: The Constitution makes it clear that the power
to declare war is in the hands of the Congress. . . the
resolution is an exercise of part of that constitutional 
power. 1,195 Law professor William Van Alstyne bases his 
view of the Resolution's constitutionality on provisions of 
the Constitution other than the declaration clause. He 
finds the WPR's authority in Congress' exclusive power to 
determine whether the U.S. will have an army or navy and on 
Congress' power to make all laws that are necessary and 
proper.196
Constitutional scholars John Hart Ely, Michael 
Glennon, Lawrence Tribe, and Alexander Bickel conclude the 
Framers clearly intended that all wars, whether declared or 
undeclared, be legislatively authorized.197 In discussing 
the WPR, constitutional expert Louis Henken similarly
195 Quoted in "War Powers and the Responsibility of 
Congress," p . 3.
196 Bennett et al. , p. 26.
197 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that 
Worked," p . 1386.
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explained that Congress has the power to limit or regulate
uses of force in situations of war and those short of
war.198 Law Professor William Spong elaborated:
In enacting the Resolution, Congress did not seek to 
change the constitutional powers of the President.
What they hoped to create was a procedural mechanism 
for coordinating the war and peace constitutional 
responsibilities of the President and Congress, a 
procedure that would bring Congress to a position where 
it might exercise its proper role.199
Glennon responds to opponents of the Resolution's time 
limits on presidential military action by stating that their 
argument applies to any constitutional limitation on 
presidential power. 200 Legal commentator Stephen Carter 
avoids the original intent conundrum by asserting that the 
WPR is constitutional as a mechanism effectuating Congress' 
role in a system of checks and balances.201
2. POLICY
After defending the Resolution's constitutionality, 
supporters of the WPR explain that it also constitutes good 
policy. Bickel counters pragmatic critiques of the WPR and 
contends that clarifying congressional control over war
198 Louis Henken, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
(Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 1972), p. 103.
199 William B. Spong, Jr., "The American Constitutional 
War Powers From Afar--Another Look," Federal Law Review 19 
(March 1990), p. 105.
200 Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 95.
201 Stephen L. Carter, "The Constitutionality of the War 
Powers Resolution," Virginia Law Review 7 0 (February 19 84), p. 
112 .
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powers will enhance American credibility abroad by requiring 
the U.S. to make commitments through specific and binding 
legislation. 202 Political scientist Morton Halperin adds 
that congressional participation is necessary for the 
success of foreign policy and military policy. He 
elaborates: "The benefits of public consensus on military
action far outweigh the conceivable loss to some 
opportunities stemming from public debate and congressional 
approval. 1,203
Proponents of the Resolution such as Stuart Darling 
argue that it is dangerous to allow one person to make 
decisions regarding war and that executive expediency must 
be balanced by legislative restraint. 204 Legal scholar 
Steven Shuster adds that the Resolution is necessary to 
avoid gradually escalating conflicts and political quagmires 
such as Vietnam; promoting the rule of law is always 
beneficial in the long-term. As constitutional expert Jules
202 Alexander Bickel, Introduction to Javits, Who Makes 
War, p. xi. Historian Barbara Tuchman denies that Congress' 
role in war is obsolete in the modern world. She eloquently 
explains:
Now the need for constitutional reform has become 
apparent, not to restore the eighteenth-century 
model, but to confirm its classic balance of powers 
and validate its restraints upon the Executive for 
late-twentieth-century conditions. The War Powers
Act is the first step. (Barbara W. Tuchman, Ibid., 
p. vii).
203 Halperin, "Lawful Wars," p. 175.
Darling, p. 134.
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Lobel explained, democratic government is diminished when 
the executive is able to abuse constitutional power on the 
pretext of national security.205
In reply to the contention that the Resolution was 
simply a response to Vietnam, Halperin argues that the WPR 
had a "deeper source, 1 which was to reestablish Congress' 
role in decisions regarding war. 206 Although proponents
of the WPR concede that it needs to be amended to be 
effective, they view it as both beneficial and necessary. 
James Nathan argues that even though presidents have 
systematically flouted the Resolution's restrictions, the 
existence of the War Powers Resolution may have checked 
further presidential forays abroad and limited the extent of 
presidential military involvements. In fact, Nathan 
contends, if not for the Resolution, President Bush might 
have disregarded Congress entirely in the Gulf War.207 
Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance similarly states that 
the WPR has increased "presidential self-restraint" by 
reminding the president he must gain political support prior 
to exercising force. 208 Shuster adds that the Resolution's
205 Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of 
Liberalism," Yale Law Journal 98 (May 1989), p. 1422.
206 Halperin, "Lawful Wars," p. 189.
207 Nathan, "Curbing the Distress of War," p. 626.
208 Cyrus R. Vance, "Striking the Balance: Congress and 
the President under the War Powers Resolution," University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 133 (December 1984), p. 90.
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"mere existence forces Congress to debate military 
decisions" even when presidents fail to comply with the 
letter of the law.209
Legal scholar Joshua Prober carries the argument 
further and claims that the Resolution is a beneficial and 
powerful political tool to use against the president. It 
gives Congress the ability to criticize the president for 
not complying with the Resolution rather than criticizing 
him for a potentially popular military action.210 It 
should be remembered that the success of the WPR should not 
be based exclusively on the success of its operative 
provisions, but also on achieving its goal of assuring 
Congress a voice regarding presidential military 
activity.211
Interestingly enough, political scientist William Olson 
considers the debate and concludes that both sides are right 
because the Constitution divides authority over foreign 
affairs and the arguments are based upon different 
provisions. He views the Resolution as a political, not 
legal, statement and notes that the Resolution's problem is
Shuster, p. 487
Prober, p. 179.
Henry, p. 1057.
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not constitutionality but enforceability since it does not 
contemplate sanctions against recalcitrant presidents.212
The debate over the WPR is clearly an extenuation of 
the disagreement created by fundamentally different 
interpretations of the Constitution. History indicates, 
then, that there may never be any consensus on the 
Resolution's constitutionality. Irrespective of its legal 
and practical flaws, however, the WPR can provide a useful 
framework for political accommodation and negotiation in war 
powers disputes. It will remain impotent, however, if 
Congress does not aggressively pursue its co-equal role and 
amend and enforce its requirements.213
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
Considering the diametrically opposed interpretations 
of the constitutionality and efficacy of the WPR it is not 
surprising that the Resolution has never functioned as 
intended. John Hart Ely explains that the WPR has not 
worked because of presidential defiance, congressional 
acquiescence, and judicial abstention.214 Rather than 
discarding the WPR, however, numerous legislators and
212 William C. Olson, "The US Congress: An Independent
Force in World Politics," International Affairs 67 (Summer 
1991), p. 548.
213 Martin Wald, "The Future of the War Powers 
Resolution," Stanford Law Review 36 (July 1984), p. 1409.
214 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that 
Worked," p. 1381.
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prominent legal scholars have sought to revise the 
Resolution with a plethora of proposed amendments.215
A. SECTION 2
Section 2 of the WPR has been criticized as 
underinclusive and (in any event) non-binding. Thus, a 
bipartisan group proposed an amendment (the Byrd proposal) 
that would have, among other things, repealed section 2(c) 
which enumerates the executive's power as commander-in- 
chief . Several commentators on the WPR such as Sofaer and 
Shuster continue to support this modification to give the 
president more flexibility in foreign policy.
On the other hand, WPR advocate Glennon argues that the 
provision is simply unduly narrow and should be amended to 
include the inherent presidential power to rescue endangered 
Americans.216 Glennon, Thomas Franck, and Morton Halperin 
favor expanding the list of presidential powers further and 
propose retrieving the original Senate proposal that would 
mandatorily require congressional approval prior to troop 
commitments except in the enumerated circumstances. Glennon
215 Given the controversial constitutionality of the 
WPR, at least three authors suggest that the Constitution be 
amended to provide for congressional consultation. (Ray
Forrester, "Presidential War in the Nuclear Age: An
Unresolved Problem," George Washington Law Review 57 (August 
1989), p. 1639; Rourke and Farnen, p. 518).
Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 96.
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and Franck suggest that a funding prohibition be attached to 
encourage presidential compliance.217
Glennon, Shuster, and Henken, among others, 
additionally recommend that the term "hostilities" be 
defined clearly to reduce the possibility of presidents 
evading the Resolution by claiming their military activity 
does not involve hostilities-- a situation that has arisen 
repeatedly in the past.218 The House committee report on 
the Resolution found that the term "hostilities" was broadly 
intended to include "any state of confrontation in which 
there is clear and present danger of armed conflict."219 
Shuster uniquely suggests that the definition should be 
drafted by both the executive and legislative branches to 
assist in forging a consensus on future troop 
engagements.220
B . SECTION 3
Several supporters of the WPR argue that the 
consultation requirement in section 3 be strengthened and 
consultation defined. Presidents have misinterpreted this
217 Ibid., p. 115.
218 To avoid semantic hairsplitting, hostilities could 
be defined by a concrete occurrence such as a specified number 
of U.S. casualties or by deployed troops receiving combat pay. 
("Realism, Liberalism and the War Powers Resolution," p. 650- 
51) .
219 Quoted by Shuster, p. 459 (H.R. Rep. No. 287, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
220 Ibid., p. 496.
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section and have informed Congress of military activity 
rather than having meaningfully consulted with them prior it 
its initiation.221 The section should also be amended to 
specify which legislators should be consulted as a 
discussion with Congress as a whole would admittedly be too 
cumbersome. 222 It has been suggested that a "Permanent 
Consultative Group" be created which would consist of the 
leadership of both the House and Senate and various 
committees. This group would meet on a regular basis with 
the president to be consulted on possible U.S. military 
action. 223 Commentators emphasize that, where possible, 
consultation must occur before troops are deployed and 
patriotic fervor makes a negative congressional response 
impossible.
Although Representative Lee Hamilton favors clarifying 
the consultation requirement, he insightfully adds that the 
Resolution will work if there is an attitude of good faith 
and mutual respect; however, if those attributes are lacking
221 Edwin Firmage adds that the term "consultation" be 
defined as "genuine collaborative decision-making" before 
troops are deployed. (Firmage, p. 257).
222 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that 
Worked," pp. 14 00-01.
223 Eugene Rostow opposes the creation of a permanent 
consulting group as it would require a congressional voice in 
presidential decision-making and "destroy the unitary 
Presidency, one of the two great innovations of the American 
Constitution." (Rostow, "President, Prime Minister or 
Constitutional Monarch, p. 749).
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then the Resolution will not function no matter how the 
consultation portion is amended.224
C . SECTION 4
Another loophole of the WPR that presidents have 
consistently exploited is its failure to require the 
president to specify what type of section 4 report he is 
filing. Because only a section 4(a)(1) report 
authomatically trigger the time constraint, the president 
can report to Congress without commencing the 60 day 
period. 225 Thus, presidents have sent reports of military 
activity to Congress and described them simply as 
"consistent with" the''•Resolution. A more detailed reporting 
requirement might help to minimize presidential evasion.226 
Because sections 3 and 4 are not explicit, Nathan adds that 
presidents have used the reporting requirement in lieu of 
the consultation requirement and merely informed Congress of
224 Quoted in War Powers and the Constitution, p. 13.
General Scowcroft, an opponent of the Resolution, stated it 
differently: "The trouble is that with the right spirit we do
not need the War Powers Resolution; with the wrong spirit, the 
War Powers Resolution really does not affect the executive." 
(Ibid., p. 16).
225 Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 104.
226 Ely and Glennon propose that section 4(a) (2) and
4(a)(3) be eliminated as those reports do not trigger the 60 
day clock and thus give the President a loophole to report but 
not be required to remove troops. (Ely, "Suppose Congress
Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked," p. 1404; Glennon,
Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 115).
80
their actions. The WPR could also be amended to provide for 
the report's secrecy.227
Ely argues that this section should also be modified to 
state that if the president fails to start the clock by 
filing a section 4(a)(1) report, one or more members of 
Congress should have standing to file suit in federal 
court. 228 Interestingly enough, Ely does not want the 
court to decide whether hostilities have actually commenced. 
Rather, he contends that the court should merely remand the 
case to Congress and force them to make a decision regarding 
whether the clock has been started by deploying troops in a 
situation of hostilities. 229 Other commentators similarly 
support adding language to the amendment promoting judicial 
review; however, they argue that the court is best qualified 
to adjudicate possible violations of the Resolution. 230 As
227 Quoted in Francis 0. Wilcox and Richard A. Frank, 
eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of Foreign Policy (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 119-20.
228 Glennon argues, on the other hand, that the 
Resolution is a "dead letter" if Congress is forced to 
determine when the clock should start for its drafters 
intended the Resolution to be a self-starting mechanism 
voluntarily initiated by the president.
(Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, pp. 105-106).
229 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that 
Worked," p. 1406. This seems ironically circuitous. Ely is 
saying that Congress does not have the courage to directly 
challenge the president and decide by resolution whether 
hostilities have begun so the Court should order them to do 
so. It seems that if Congress will not determine that 
hostilities have begun on its own, a court order would be 
ineffective.
230 Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 112.
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Edwin Firmage explains: "Whether we go to war is a
political question to be decided by Congress. . . . The wav
we go to war is not."231
D. SECTION 5(B)
Most supporters of the Resolution recognize that one of 
its primary problems is that it grants the president 6 0 days 
to deploy troops and thus present Congress with a fait 
accompli which Congress, as a practical matter, will rarely 
have the political will to overcome. To combat this 
problem, Stuart Darling agrees with other commentators that 
the WPR be amended along the lines of the original Senate 
version. This would require that Congress approve of troop 
commitments prior to their deployment except in several 
narrowly defined emergencies. 232 According to Darling, 
this would still allow the president to act unilaterally 
when vital U.S. interests are threatened.233
Ely argues that granting the president 60 days (plus a 
possible additional 30 days) is too generous. He would 
amend section 5 to give the president only 3 0 days to deploy
231 Firmage, p. 264.
232 Darling, p. 133.
233 Glennon further suggests that the Resolution's 
restraints be enlarged to cover covert activity. (Glennon, 
Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 17) . Douglas Steele concurs and 
suggests that the language covering covert operations be 
broadly drafted and provide for the requisite secrecy. 
(Steele, pp. 1156-57).
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troops without Congress' explicit approval. 234 Ely and 
Glennon strongly argue that there must be a time limitation 
placed1 on presidential military activity or the president 
would be permitted to leave troops indefinitely.235
Because of its controversial nature, other proponents 
of the WPR favor removing the 6 0 day clock altogether. The 
Byrd proposal would have removed the time limit and 
substituted an expedited procedure for considering 
legislation introduced by the Permanent Consultative Group. 
Opponents of the Resolution support eliminating section 5 
because requiring troops be removed once they are deployed 
undermines presidential foreign policy. 236 Professor 
Trimble adds that the provision precipitates a congressional 
debate before the issues are clarified. He suggests instead 
an expedited procedure for considering the military 
situation 9 to 12 months after it is initiated.237
234 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers
Resolution that Worked," p. 1399.
235 Ibid., pp. 1383-84; Glennon, Constitutional
Diplomacy, pp. 119-120.
236 Patrick D. Robbins, "The War Powers Resolution after 
Fifteen Years: A Reassessment," American University Law
Review 38 (Fall 1988), p. 143.
237 Abraham Sofaer and Geoffrey Miller fault section
5 because it allows Congress to require troop withdrawals by 
doing nothing. (Sofaer, p. 324).
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E. SECTION 5(C)
There is perhaps the most consensus among WPR authors 
on the need to modify section 5(c) which provides that 
Congress can require the president to remove troops by 
concurrent resolution not subject to the president's veto. 
Most commentators on the WPR, including Representative 
Hamilton, Patrick Robbins, and Glennon, concede that this 
section is probably unconstitutional because it constitutes 
the type of legislative veto struck down by the Supreme 
Court's decision in I.N.S. v. Chadha. 238 In Chadha. the 
Court ruled that where Congress delegates authority to the 
executive it cannot legislatively veto executive action by 
concurrent resolution but must present a resolution to the 
president subject to his veto.
Ely, Steele, and Senator Javits, however, maintain a 
plausible argument could be made that section 5 (c) is 
constitutional and can be distinguished from Chadha. They 
argue Congress did not delegate the authority to the 
president in the WPR to deploy troops and thus the Chadha 
presentment and bicameralism requirements do not apply.239
230 103 S.Ct. 2764 (1983) .
239 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that 
Worked," pp. 13 95-96.
Ely and Firmage add that section 5 (b) should be 
augmented to state if the President fails to terminate the use 
of military force, funds to support the troops will be 
immediately terminated. As Congress may be reluctant to take 
responsibility and affirmatively deny appropriations, this 
should bolster Congress' ability to restrict presidential 
military activity. (Ibid., p. 1401).
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Bills proposing that the WPR be repealed or revised 
have been introduced in Congress every year since 1973. 
Although some have been seriously considered, none have 
passed. On October 22, 1993, Senate Democrats announced 
plans to rework the Resolution. Similar legislation has 
been introduced in the House. 240 considering the history 
of congressional inertia on the issue, it is not surprising 
that both resolutions died in committee. The new Republican 
majority elected in 1994 has not announced its position on 
war powers reforms.
V. CONCLUSION
The WPR is as controversial today as it was when it was 
first enacted. The geographical focus of the debate has 
simply shifted from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf to Haiti. 
Although opponents of the WPR articulately present their 
arguments, the Resolution is well supported by 
constitutional and political considerations. The text of 
the Constitution and the Framer's intent indicates that 
Congress is granted plenary powers over war. The WPR merely 
attempts, albeit imperfectly, to redefine that authority.
As a practical matter, if Congress has the authority to 
determine when America will go to war it should have the 
commensurate power to pass legislation that explains and 
procedurally facilitates this power.
240 Doherty, "On Somalia, War Powers Law Becomes a GOP 
Weapon," p. 2987.
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Constitutional considerations aside, the WPR also 
serves several significant political purposes. The 
democratic process is protected by separating power, 
encouraging debate, and requiring consensus. The Framers 
wanted it to be difficult for the U.S. to get into war 
because they recognized that hostilities are rarely 
beneficial in the long-run. Although a binding WPR will 
admittedly preempt some presidential military successes, it 
will also prevent presidential debacles such as Vietnam and 
the Marine deployment in Lebanon.
The Resolution's political benefits, however, cannot be 
fully realized until its weaknesses are rectified by 
amendment. The Resolution's gravest functional problem is 
that it allows the president to initially deploy troops for 
6 0 days without congressional authorization. As a practical 
matter, once troops are committed it becomes politically 
difficult for Congress to require their return. The 
original Senate language should be retrieved which would 
require the president to seek congressional approval prior 
to deploying troops in hostile situations except in clearly 
defined emergencies.
As consulting with the entire Congress is unwieldy and 
impractical, a consultative group of congressional 
leadership should be established with whom the president 
must consult on offensive military operations and covert 
activity. The term "hostilities" must be clearly and
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unambiguously defined (if such a thing is possible), to 
replace arguments of semantics with arguments of substance. 
Although the concurrent resolution provision may be 
constitutional, it is so controversial it should be 
eliminated. Finally, to promote presidential compliance and 
judicial review, the WPR should contain language restricting 
military appropriations and providing a majority of Congress 
with judicial standing to file suit if the president refuses 
to comply with the Resolution's requirements.
Although these modifications will not guarantee 
presidential compliance with the WPR, they will encourage 
it. Ultimately, however, Congress' ability to reassert its 
constitutional war power depends much more on congressional 
will than on the WPR, no matter how artfully drafted.
History has shown without that will, no constitutional, and 
certainly no legislative, safeguard is sufficient.
CHAPTER 4
UNITED NATIONS AUTHORIZATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In addition to claiming constitutional authority to 
conduct military activity in the Persian Gulf, President 
Bush argued that United Nations' resolutions granted him the 
power to take offensive action. When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 
August 2, 1990, the Security Council immediately passed 
Resolution 660 which declared that a breach of the peace had 
occurred and demanded Iraq withdraw.241 Several other 
resolutions followed imposing economic and diplomatic 
sanctions against Iraq. Resolution 678 was passed by the 
Security Council on November 29, 1990. It authorized member 
states to use "all necessary means" to implement previous 
U.N. resolutions demanding an Iraqi withdrawal from 
Kuwait. 242 President Bush subsequently asserted he had
241 Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker. The United
Nations in the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p.
73 .
242 The pertinent provisions of Resolution 678 are:
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 
660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and 
decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to 
allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of
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authority under international law to implement Resolution 
678 without further authorization from Congress.243
In order to obtain international support for the use of 
force, Secretary of State Baker began extensive 
international negotiations in early November. He visited 
the countries of the Security Council and the anti-Iraq 
coalition. Several authors argue that President Bush's 
primary rationale in seeking Resolution 678 was to present 
Congress with a diplomatic fait accompli that would force 
them to approve his military actions in the Gulf.244 
Although it would be cynical to state that the President's 
foremost motive in seeking the Resolution was to circumvent 
Congress, evidence indicates that it was certainly a 
consideration.
goodwill, to do so; 2. Authorizes Member States 
co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless 
Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, 
as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing 
resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold 
and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent 
relevant resolutions and to restore international 
peace and security in the area; 3. Requests all 
States to provide appropriate support for the
actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of
the present resolution;. . . (quoted by Michael J.
Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter," The American Journal of 
International Law 85 (January 1991) , pp. 74-75) .
243 After assisting in the negotiations with the
Security Council to pass Resolution 678, Undersecretary of
State Bob Kimmit stated: "We feel like now we have a strong
basis in international law for the use of force." (quoted in 
Triumph Without Victory, p. 182).
Ibid., pp. 175-78; Smith, p. 207.
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Ironically, Congress convened hearings on President 
Bush's actions in the Gulf two days before Resolution 678 
was passed. The administration failed to send its top 
witnesses to the congressional hearings for fear of 
upsetting delicate U.N. negotiations over the Resolution.
In effect, President Bush indicated that the U.N. 
discussions took precedence over congressional 
discussions.245
On January 3, President Bush sent a letter to Congress 
requesting congressional approval for the war. He requested 
a resolution authorizing him to use "all necessary means" to 
eject Iraq from Kuwait. By deliberately using the language 
from Resolution 678, Congress was being asked only to 
authorize the President to enforce a resolution already 
adopted by the Security Council. Thus, Bush's aides noted, 
he could obtain congressional acquiescence while 
sidestepping the constitutional issue.246
Not surprisingly, supporters of President Bush used 
Resolution 678 as a primary rationale for endorsing the 
President's actions in the Gulf. The comments of Paul Henry 
(R.Mich.) during the congressional debate over the Gulf 
crisis in January were representative of many in Congress:
245 John F. Lehman, Making War (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1992), p. 39.
Triumph Without Victory, pp. 202-203
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The U.S. Congress ought not to put itself at odds 
against the United Nations or question the 
considered opinion and actions of the Security 
Council. Turning against the United Nations in 
this instance would strike a blow against the 
struggle to refine and strengthen international 
peacekeeping institutions that will be so 
important in the post-cold war era.247
A joint congressional resolution authorizing the use of
force was passed on January 12, 1991. It referred to the
United Nations five times and U.N. Resolution 678 twice.248
Clearly, the existence of Resolution 678 increased the
likelihood Congress would authorize the Persian Gulf
War. 249 It also increased the likelihood that President
Bush would have gone to war without Congress. After the war
the President commented:
Though I felt after studying the question that I had 
the inherent power to commit our forces to battle after 
the United Nations Resolution, I solicited 
congressional support before committing our forces to 
the Gulf War.250
President Bush had discovered a new source of 
legitimacy for executive war-making: multilateral
commitments under the auspices of the U.N.251 Whether 
Security Council authorization to use force can be
247 Robert W. Gregg, About Face? The United States and 
the United Nations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1993), p. 117.
248 Ibid., p. 117.
249 Ibid.
250 President Bush's speech at Princeton University on 
May 10, 1991, quoted by Pfiffner, p. 11.
The Gulf War Reader, p. 192.
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substituted for a congressional declaration of war, however, 
is a question that can be answered by the text of the U.N. 
Charter and enabling legislation, the opinions of legal 
scholars, the history of U.N. military activity, and the 
text of Resolution 678 itself.
II. THE U.N. CHARTER
Section 7 of the U.N. Charter discusses the use of 
military force. Article 39 provides that the Security 
Council will determine when a breach of the peace occurs and 
will make recommendations to restore peace. 252 The only 
section relating to the use of force, Article 42, provides 
that the Security Council is authorized to "take such action 
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security," including 
"demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, 
or land forces of Members of the United Nations."253
252 The entire text of Article 39 is as follows:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendation, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.
253 The entire text of Article 42 states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or 
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such 
action by air, sea or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockage, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United 
Nations.
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Military personnel and equipment to be used for such 
U.N. operations are provided for only in Article 43. It 
requires member states to "undertake to make available to 
the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a 
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, 
and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for 
the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security." Article 43 adds that the armed forces to be 
utilized by the Security Council will be provided by member 
states pursuant to special agreements to be negotiated "in 
accordance with the respective constitutional processes" of 
each member state.254
Although Article 42 does provide that the Security 
Council can take military action, the equipment and troops 
necessary for such action are wholly dependent upon the
254 The entire text of Article 43 states:
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to 
contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, undertake to make available to 
the Security Council, on its call and in accordance 
with a special agreement or agreements, armed 
forces, assistance and facilities, including rights 
of passage, necessary for the purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the 
numbers and types of forces, their degree of 
readiness and general location, and the nature of 
the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3 . The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated 
as soon as possible on the initiative of the 
Security Council. They shall be concluded between 
the Security Council and Members or between the 
Security Council and groups of Members and shall be 
subject to ratification by the signatory states in 
accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes.
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adoption of specific agreements. Article 43 explicitly
requires these agreements be adopted pursuant to the
"constitutional processes" of each member. This language
preserves Congress' constitutional role in any decision to
commit U.S. troops to war--whether that war is
internationally sanctioned or not. No such agreement has
ever been ratified by the U.S. or any other nation. A
treatise on the Charter of the U.N. explains:
Article 42 by itself does not specify the source 
of the "air, sea, or land forces" for implementing 
military enforcement measures. The drafters of 
the Charter clearly expected that the forces would 
be made available to the Security Council in 
accordance with the "special agreements" to be 
concluded under Article 43. The link between the 
two articles is specifically indicated in Article 
106, which envisages possible joint action by the 
permanent members pending the coming into force of 
such special agreements referred to in Article 43
255
The plain text of Articles 42 and 43 indicates that the 
Security Council cannot obligate or authorize a member state 
to deploy troops unless that nation has signed a special 
agreement to do so. 256 As the United States has never 
adopted such an agreement, the Security Council could not 
substitute for Congress in authorizing President Bush to
255 Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Anne Patricia 
Simmons, Charter of the United Nations. 3rd ed. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 316.
256 Berger, p. 93.
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take offensive action in the Persian Gulf. 257 Because no 
special agreements had been adopted, in the case of Kuwait 
the Security Council requested the use of ad hoc forces to 
restore peace. 258 Although the Security Council can 
request such action be taken, nothing in the U.N. Charter 
requires the U.S. to comply or provides the president with 
any additional authority.
The background of the U.N. Charter supports this 
interpretation. The U.N. Charter was initially drafted at a 
meeting attended by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Britain 
in Dumbarton Oaks. Prior to that meeting in April 1944, 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull met with a select senatorial 
committee to discuss drafts of the U.N. plan. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to involve the Senators early 
in the process to avoid the embarrassing defeat Woodrow
257 The executive branch also cited Article 51 as 
authorization for President Bush's military activity. Article 
51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self- 
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. . .
This contention is not supported by the text of Article 51. 
This provision merely recognizes the right of collective self- 
defense, it does not authorize such action. Nothing in 
article 51 supercedes the constitutional requirement of a 
congressional declaration of war. Moreover, U.N. lawyers 
argued that the article prohibits unilateral action by one 
country in support of another once the Security Council has 
taken measures to restore international peace. (Hiro, pp. 
131-32) .
258 Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in 
a New World Order," Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991), p. 73.
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Wilson experienced with the League of Nations. Hull assured 
the Senators that any agreement to supply troops for U.N. 
missions would be submitted to them in advance for 
approval.259
In August 1944, however, State Department Legal Advisor 
Green Hackworth prepared and circulated a memo arguing that 
once the Senate approved the U.N. Charter the president 
would have the authority to commit troops to U.N. 
peacekeeping operations. 260 To alleviate congressional 
criticism of this position, Edward Stettinius, the head of 
the American delegation to Dumbarton Oaks, included the 
reservation in Article 43 that each special agreement would 
be subject to ratification in accordance with the member 
states' constitutional processes.261
The official U.N. Charter was drafted at the San 
Francisco Conference in 1945. When Article 43 was 
discussed, it was agreed that members would not have to 
furnish military assistance in excess of any special 
agreement. A treatise on the U.N. concludes: "This leads
to the inference that a member is under no obligation to 
take military action under Article 42 until it has concluded
259 Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 57.
260 Ibid., p. 150.
261 Ibid., p. 156.
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a special agreement under Article 43. 1,252 When discussing 
the creation of a United Nations Guard in 1948, Secretary- 
General Trygve Lie similarly stated that action under 
Article 42 could only be taken in accordance with a special 
agreement under Article 43.263
In the absence of a special agreement, then, the 
president must either go to Congress for a declaration or 
use his inherent, yet limited, constitutional authority to 
"repel sudden attacks."264
A. SENATE RATIFICATION
Article 43 became crucial during the ratification 
debates in the Senate. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, one of 
the delegates to the U.N. conference in San Francisco which 
adopted the final version of the U.N. Charter, emphasized to 
the Senate that the Charter preserved American 
"constitutional processes."265 He did acknowledge, 
however, that the president could use preliminary force in 
small-scale police actions which did not amount to war.266 
In speeches favoring ratification, Senators Burton Wheeler, 
Barkley, and White stated that the special agreements
262 Goodrich, Hambro and Simmons, p. 316.
263 Quoted in Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter," p. 77.
264 Stromseth, p. 92.
265 91 Congressional Record 7957 (1945) .
266 Ibid., p. 7992.
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detailing military commitments to the U.N. would return to 
the Senate for confirmation. 267 Senator Wheeler added that 
at the time the agreements were presented the Senate could 
determine their policy regarding sending troops to foreign 
countries.268
The debate indicates that the overwhelming majority of 
Senators believed Congress would play its constitutional 
role in determining U.S. military commitments to the U.N.
The major controversy in the Senate concerned only whether 
the special agreements were to be ratified by 2/3's of the 
Senate as treaties were or whether they would be ratified by 
joint legislation of both Houses.
Another delegate to the San Francisco conference, 
Senator Connelly, interpreted the "constitutional processes" 
by which the special agreements would be adopted to be 
Senate ratification. 269 Senator Hill argued, on the other 
hand, that the amount of military forces to be supplied 
should be decided by both houses of Congress.270
During the Senate discussion over how troops would be
provided to the U.N., San Francisco delegate John Foster
Dulles testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee was reviewed and emphasized. When asked if the
267 Ibid., p. 7970-71; 7987; 7993.
268 Ibid., p. 7987.
269 Ibid., p. 7987.
270 Ibid., p. 7988.
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Senate would have a chance to ratify the special agreements, 
Dulles had stated, "it is not only my opinion, but it is 
expressly stated in the charter that the agreements are 
subject to ratification by the states in accordance with 
their constitutional processes."271 According to Dulles, 
constitutional processes signified treaty ratification by 
2/3's of the Senate.
Dulles continued that it was the view of the entire 
American delegation to San Francisco that the agreements 
would consist of a supplemental treaty rather than an 
executive agreement. 272 Senator Vandenburg concurred that 
furnishing troops to the U.N. under the Charter could not be 
done by executive agreement. 273 Senator Wheeler similarly 
stated that the American people would never support the U.N. 
treaty if it meant the president could send troops anywhere 
and take power away from Congress. 274 It was understood by 
the Senate that if the president wanted to deploy more 
troops to the U.N. than specified in the special agreement, 
Congress would have to separately authorize it.275
Legal scholar John Hart Ely concludes that the argument 
that authorization from the Security Council replaces
271 Ibid., p. 7990.
272 Ibid., p. 7990.
273 Ibid., p. 7991.
274 Ibid., p. 7988.
275 Stromseth, p. 86.
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authorization from Congress not only violates the specific 
grounds on which Congress accepted membership, it also 
violates the Constitution. 276 Edward Corwin adds that a 
treaty cannot be read to augment the war power of the 
president. 277 Other commentators suggest that even if the 
Senate had intended to delegate its warmaking role to the 
president under the U.N. Charter, it could not do so alone 
by treaty. 278 The House of Representatives must concur in 
any decision to go to war and it would be unconstitutional 
for any treaty to purport to divest them of this right.279
B. THE UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT
Any remaining questions regarding the appropriate 
method of providing troops for U.N. operations were answered 
when Congress passed the United Nations Participation Act 
(UNPA) in December 1945. The UNPA, which outlined the terms 
of American participation in the U.N., specifically states:
276 Ely, War and Responsibility, p. 11.
277 Edward S. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution 
(Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), p. 152.
278 Berger, p. 86; Stromseth, p. 92.
279 Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter," pp. 84-85.
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The President is authorized to negotiate a special 
agreement or agreements with the Security Council 
which shall be subject to the approval of the 
Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution, 
providing for the numbers and types of armed 
forces, their degree of readiness and the nature 
of facilities and assistance, including rights of 
passage, to be made available to the Security 
Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security in accordance 
with article 43 of said Charter. . . . Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall be construed 
as an authorization to the President by the 
Congress to make available to the Security Council 
for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or 
assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, 
and assistance provided for in such special 
agreement or agreements.280
The legislative debate over the UNPA was strikingly similar
to the Senate discussion regarding the U.N. Charter. After
reiterating that the legislators' powers were protected by
the requirement that Congress pass upon any special
agreement before military assistance would be provided to
the U.N., Representative Bloom (N.Y.) concluded: "the
traditional relationship between the executive and
legislative branches of our government is fully
preserved."281 Representative Jarman (Ala.) added in
response to the question of whether issues of war would come
back to Congress: "In no respect does Congress divest
itself of the right to declare war or not to declare
war. "282 These comments, and the statements of senators
Quoted by Corwin, p. 221
91 Cong. Rec. 12267 (1945) .
Ibid., p . 12288.
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during the U.N. Charter debates, are representative of the 
majority of legislators who believed that their 
constitutional role in initiating war would be preserved 
under the U.N. system. Although there were several 
legislators who worried that adopting the Charter and UNPA 
would confer war-making power on the president, they were a 
small minority.283
Just as both Houses of Congress must concur in the 
critical decision over going to war, both Houses must 
determine whether U.S. troops will be made available to the 
U.N. for military enforcement actions. The text of the UNPA 
and reports from the House and Senate underscored the fact 
that neither the Act nor the Charter conferred any authority 
on the president to provide troops to the Security Council 
under anything but an Article 43 agreement ratified by 
Congress. 284 Professor Corwin concludes that, "the 
controlling theory of the act is that American participation
283 The House vote on the UNPA was 344 Yeas, 15 Nays, 72 
Not Voting, and 1 Voting Present. (91 Cong. Rec. 122 88 
(1945)) .
284 The reports stated in part:
At the same time it was considered important to 
make it clear that nothing contained in the statue 
should be construed as an authorization to the 
President by the Congress to make available to the 
Security Council for such purpose, armed forces in 
addition to such as may be provided for in the 
military (special) agreements. (Glennon, "The 
Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter," p. 79, italics supplied).
Amendments to the UNPA do provide that the President 
can deploy up to 1000 troops as peacekeepers.
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in the United Nations shall rest on the principle of 
departmental collaboration, and not on an exclusive 
presidential prerogative in the diplomatic field."285 
Professor Louis Fisher concurs: "Pursuant to this statute,
the President can commit armed forces to the United Nations 
only after Congress grants its approval."286
Ill. KOREA
Although the U.N. has existed since 1945, the Security 
Council has only authorized the use of force to restore 
peace twice--in Korea and Kuwait. When North Korea attacked 
South Korea on June 25, 1950, the Security Council 
immediately passed a resolution which determined that a 
breach of the peace had occurred and called on North Korea 
to cease hostilities and withdraw. When North Korea failed 
to respond, the Security Council "called on" its members to 
implement the resolution.
On June 27, 1950, President Harry Truman ordered troops 
to Korea without consulting Congress. In his statement 
announcing the deployment, he quoted from the Security 
Council's resolution demanding North Korea withdraw.287 
Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated: "All
action taken by the United States to restore peace in Korea
Ibid.
Fisher, "The Power of Commander in Chief," p. 54.
Lofgren, p. 208.
285
286 
287
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has been under the aegis of the United Nations." 288 It 
should be noted, however, that the Security Council did not 
pass a specific resolution recommending members furnish 
military assistance until the day after President Truman 
committed U.S. troops.
In his memoirs, Dean Acheson explains that President 
Truman did meet with congressional leaders to brief them 
about the situation in Korea on June 2 7th and June 3 0th. At 
the second meeting, Senator H. Alexander Smith suggested 
that a joint resolution be introduced supporting the 
President's actions. President Truman referred the matter 
to Acheson for a recommendation. On July 3, Acheson 
recommended that the President rely on his power as 
commander-in-chief and as president rather than requesting 
congressional authorization. The State Department then 
prepared a bulletin outling 87 instances in which 
president's had responded militarily on their own 
initiative.289
288 Fisher, "The Power of Commander in Chief," p. 55.
289 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), pp. 413-14.
In a recently published article in the National Security 
Law Report. legal scholar Robert Turner challenges the 
conventional wisdom that Truman ignored Congress. Turner 
discusses several recently declassefied documents which 
indicate that Truman immediately met with congressional 
leaders after the North Korean invasion to discuss deploying 
troops. According to these documents, it was Truman who 
suggested introducing a joint resolution supporting his 
actions but was told by several members of congress that it 
was not necessary. Turner concludes that Truman attempted to 
keep Congress informed and left it to Congress to determine
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Although some in Congress decried this unilateral use 
of presidential military power, Cold War considerations led 
the majority to pass legislation facilitating the Korean 
War. In discussing Korea later, however, legal scholar 
Charles Lofgren summarized the feelings of many legislators 
and scholars: "Quite clearly the resolutions of the
Security Council provided no substitute for a declaration of 
war in terms of domestic constitutional law. "290
If Korea did provide a precedent for Kuwait, it is 
certainly an anomalous one. In the U.N.'s 50 year history, 
Korea and Kuwait are the only instances of U.N. sanctioned 
large-scale military action. One anomalous war cannot serve 
as the basis for reinterpreting America's treaty obligations
whether additional authorization was necessary. (Robert F. 
Turner, "Truman Didn't Ignore Congress," National Security Law 
Report 16 (September 1994), pp. 1-6).
Although these new documents shed additional light on the 
events surrounding the Korean War, they do not alter the 
relevance of comparisons between the Gulf War and Korean War. 
The Korean War remains pivotal in any examination of the 
expansion of presidential war powers. Like the Persian Gulf 
War, President Truman relied on U.N. authorization and his 
power as commander-in-chief to defend his military actions. 
President Truman and Bush both then left it to Congress to 
challenge their actions.
290 Ibid., p. 211. Law professors Ann Van Wynen Thomas 
and A.J. Thomas disagree. They argue that where the use of 
force is recommended such as Korea, the president has the 
power to employ force short of legal war to enforce the U.N. 
Charter's treaty provisions. This argument, however, seems 
ridiculous on its face. Even if the president does posess 
constitutional authority to deploy small numbers of troops in 
situations short of war, the magnitude of the American 
military involvement in Korea indicates that it was clearly 
not such a case.
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to the U.N., nor can it provide sufficient precedent to 
redefine the constitutional allocation of war powers.
IV. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
The contention that the Security Council could not
authorize President Bush to go to war is also supported by
the text of the War Powers Resolution (WPR). The WPR
expressly states that authority for the president to 
introduce armed forces into hostilities cannot be inferred 
from any treaty or any statute.291 Although section 
8 (d)(1) of the WPR does state that nothing in the statute 
should alter the terms of existing treaties, Glennon quotes 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report which states: 
"Thus, by requiring statutory action, . . . the War Powers
Resolution would perform the important function of defining 
that elusive and controversial phrase-constitutional
291 Section 8(a) provides:
Authority to introduce United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein 
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by 
the circumstances shall not be inferred--
1) from any provision of law (whether or not
in effect before the date of the enactment of this 
joint resolution), including any provision 
contained in a appropriation Act, unless such 
provision specifically authorizes the introduction 
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities . .
2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter 
ratified unless such treaty is implemented by 
legislation specifically authorizing the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities or into such situations and stating 
that it is intended to constitute specific 
statutory authorization within the meaning of this 
joint resolution.
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processes'--which is contained in our security 
treaties."292 In other words, the WPR does not attempt to 
alter the U.N. Charter, it just explains that the Charter 
has always been interpreted by Congress as preserving its 
constitutional role in decisions over war.
Assuming arguendo that the Charter had conferred 
additional warmaking authority on the president, the WPR 
then would nullify it. The "last in time doctrine" holds 
that the latest congressional pronouncement on a given issue 
will govern. 293 Professor Edwin Firmage states: "The War
Powers Resolution, as an act of Congress subsequent to the 
formation of the United Nations, precludes United Nations 
authorization of United States military action absent 
congressional approval."294 Congress clearly intended the 
WPR to reiterate the necessity of congressional 
authorization prior to military action such as the Persian 
Gulf War.295
292 Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter," p. 83.
293 This position is also supported by Committee of U.S. 
Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan. 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.D.C. 
1988), which held that a treaty obligation is legally 
subordinate to subsequent congressional authorization.
294 Edwin B. Firmage and Joseph E. Wrona, p. 1708. 
Professor James Nathan concurs that the WPR excludes any 
inference of authority for presidential war-making, "including 
the U.N." (Nathan, "Curbing the Distress of War," p. 608).
295 Thomas Franck disagrees with this interpretation of 
the WPR. He argues that provision 8(d)(1) which states that 
nothing in the Resolution is "intended to alter . . . the
provisions of existing treaties" is internally inconsistent
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V. AUTHORIZATION OR OBLIGATION
Even if the U.N. Charter or UNPA granted the president
the right to provide troops to enforce U.N. resolutions,
Resolution 678 only "authorized" the U.S. to use "all
necessary means;" it did not require it. 296 Resolution 678
states in pertinent part:
AUTHORIZES member states cooperating with the 
Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 
Jan. 15, 1991, fully implements, as set forth in 
paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to 
use all necessary means to uphold and implement 
the Security Council Resolution 660 and all 
subsequent relevant Resolutions and to restore 
international peace and security in the area . . .
Glennon emphasizes that there is a significant legal
distinction between obligatory and permissive Security
Council decisions concerning the use of force. 297 Glennon
concludes that a permissive Security Council decision such
as Resolution 678 has no effect on the domestic
constitutional allocation of power; "that a right exists
under international law to take certain action says nothing
about whether a power exists under domestic law to exercise
with section 8 (a) which negates any inference of presidential 
authority. Franck contends that because the WPR is ambiguous, 
the U.S. is still required to fulfill its obligations under 
the U.N. charter. (Thomas M. Franck and Faiza Patel, "UN 
Police Action in Lieu of War: The Old Order Changeth, "
American Journal of International Law 85 (January 1991), pp. 
72-73) .
296 Stromseth, p. 92.
297 Glennon, p. 75.
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that right." 298 Thus, the resolution "imposed no treaty 
obligation at all."299 Fisher similarly asserts that U.S. 
actions after the resolution were permissive and subject to 
America's constitutional processes. 300 Secretary of State 
James Baker seemed to acknowledge this when he conceded that 
Resolution 678 merely authorized the use of force, it did 
not obligate it.301
Moreover, the Resolution did not require member states 
to use military force--only "all necessary means." Berger 
argues: "The option of war in support of Resolution 678 was 
a 'discretionary national decision,' subject to the 
constitutional processes of each member nation. 1,302 
President Bush's decision to implement the Resolution with 
troops was wholly his own.
298 Ibid., p. 81.
299 Raven-Hansen, p. 10.
300 Fisher, p. 57.
301 Glennon, "The Gulf War and the Constitution," p. 90.
302 Berger, p. 89. International legal scholar Jorge 
Castaneda concludes that although the Security Council can 
create a military force when breaches of the peace occur 
without complying with the procedures in Chapter 7, they may 
recommend but not require troops to establish it. (Jorge 
Castaneda, Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions, trans. 
Alba Amoia, eds. Leland M. Goodrich and William T.R. Fox, no. 
6 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 108.
In fact, Baker drafted the resolution deliberately using 
the words "all necessary means" to appease the Russians who 
did not want the use of military force to be specified in the 
resolution. (Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsch, The Gulf 
Conflict: 1990-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993), p. 229) .
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As U.N. sponsored military enforcement action becomes 
more prevalent, it is important to clarify the appropriate 
avenue of U.S. participation. Since the Gulf War, the U.N. 
has authorized peace enforcement measures in Somalia,
Bosnia, and Haiti. In fact, U.N. Ambassador Madeleine 
Albright recently concluded: "At this stage in world
history practically every foreign-policy issue has something 
to do with the U.N." 303 With the ending of the Cold War 
deadlock in the Security Council, the U.N. now possesses the 
unique ability to marshall international consensus to 
promote collective security. The U.S. should play a 
significant role in this "new world order."304
It must be remembered, however, that the Constitution 
prescribes a role for Congress before U.S. troops are 
committed to a massive offensive such as the one launched in 
Kuwait. The U.N. Charter did not, and could not, change the 
constitutional allocation of war powers. International 
support cannot serve as a substitute for domestic support.
As a member of the U.N., the president is not empowered to 
deploy more troops than his constitutional designation as 
commander-in-chief allows. Unfortunately, this conclusion
303 Kevin Fedarko, "Clinton's Blunt Instrument," Time 
(October 31, 1994), p. 31.
304 President Bush's speech to Congress on September 15, 
1990, quoted in Freedman and Karsch, p. 215.
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leads back to the endlessly debated larger discussion over 
the appropriate constitutional division of war powers.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The events surrounding the Persian Gulf War emphasized, 
and perhaps widened, the gulf between Congress and the 
president over the appropriate exercise of constitutional 
war powers. Although legal scholars utilize original intent 
arguments to justify vastly different positions on 
presidential war powers, the Framers' statements indicate 
several things.
First, based on their experience with the English king, 
they feared the executive branch would be most prone to war 
and thus could not be trusted with the power to embroil the 
nation in hostilities. The number of American unilateral 
presidential military committments abroad seem to prove 
their fears were not unfounded. Second, the Framers wanted 
it to be difficult for the nation to go to war, so they 
favored giving this power to Congress to promote 
deliberation and debate. They believed Congress could more 
appropriately determine what military involvments would be 
in the national interest and considered delay a benefit not 
a detriment. Third, the Framers intended congressional 
authority over war to be a significant power and a necessary
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curb on the executive. Given the weight the Framers gave to 
Congress' war power, it seems disengenuous to argue that the 
Framers intended the declaration clause to be obsolete or to 
apply to such a miniscule number of cases that it would be 
practically irrelevant.
Moreover, the Framers lived in a dangerous time. They 
had experienced war and understood the threats that faced 
the nation. Although the world situation has changed over 
200 years, the implications of military involvment have not. 
The provisions for war the Framers drafted are equally 
applicable today. Finally, the constitutional safeguards 
found in the separation of war powers are more vital to 
America's security than the ability of any president to 
intervene at will in international crises.
Constitutional considerations aside, there are more 
political benefits to vesting war powers in Congress than 
there are costs. Certainly Congress cannot act a rapidly as 
the president, however, history indicates that hasty 
military committments often have unintended negative 
repurcussions and may provide little long-term benefit. A 
few modern examples illustrate this point. 305 Presidential 
action was responsible for arguably America's largest 
military and foreign policy disaster: the war in Vietnam.
President Nixon then bombed Laos and invaded Cambodia.
305 It should be noted that I am not asserting that 
Congress' foreign policy and military record has been free 
from blemishes.
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President Reagan committed American marines to a disastrous 
attempt to stop the civil war in Lebanon. President Bush 
invaded Panama to depose President Noriega, a former 
American friend. Bush and Prsident Clinton also committed 
American troops to Somalia who came under fire and were 
later withdrawn with little appreciable benefit.
There are countless international situations that do 
not threaten American national interests. American prestige 
abroad is as damaged by ill-conceived military policy, as it 
is by a president whose power is checked by Congress. 
Although restrictions on presidential authority over war may 
contribute to less efficient government, they are part of 
and protect the democratic process.
The WPR can potentially facilitate such a legislative 
safeguard. If amended to eliminate several vague 
provisions, the WPR can provide a blueprint for both the 
president and Congress in future military entanglements.
The Resolution can specify a group of congressional leaders 
with whom the president can consult to provide a ready forum 
for executive-legislative discussions. If the reporting 
loophole is eliminated, the president will be required to 
report to Congress who will then have to vote on large-scale 
military committments and will be required to make the 
difficult decisions it has often evaded. Certainly, no war 
powers legislation can completely address every situation. 
However, an amended resolution will encourage presidential
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compliance and will signal Congress' determination to play a 
larger role in war powers issues.
Congress will certainly need to protect its war-making 
prerogatives as the U.S. becomes increasingly involved in 
U.N. engagements. The U.N. can be, and has been, an
effective tool for the U.S. to protect its national
interests abroad. However, the U.N. Security Council cannot
authorize the U.S. president to go to war. Asserting that
U.N. membership changes the separation of war powers 
contravenes the text of the Charter, the intent of the 
senators who ratified the document, and the Constitution. 
Articles 42 and 43 specify that U.S. troops would be 
provided to the U.N. only by separate agreements ratified by 
Congress. The senators adopted the Charter based upon their 
belief that these provisions protected their constitutional 
power to determine when American troops would be deployed.
An international consensus for war cannot, and should not, 
serve as a substitute for a domestic consensus for war.
The constitution's separated and shared war powers are 
an "invitation to struggle." That appears to be the point. 
The Framers were more concerned with the debate itself than 
the outcome. As the executive branch has increasingly 
utilyzed the military abroad and the legislative branch has 
largely remained silent, democracy has suffered because the 
debate has become less vigorous. The struggle over war 
powers should not just be fought by academics.
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Notwithstanding the differences among legal scholars 
and the executive and legislative branches over the extent 
of presidential authority, the Persian Gulf War should be an 
easy case. Here nearly 500,000 American troops were 
deployed into an extremely hostile situation. They began an 
offensive, sustained casualties, killed an estimated 
100,000 Iraqi soldiers, 306 and drove the Iraqi army from 
Kuwait. This scenario constituted war under any definition 
of the term. If, as President Bush and others contended, 
Congress had no role here, it will never have a role in 
committing the nation to war. Only Congress can protect its 
prerogatives. If Congress continues to let the president 
exercise such unilateral control over American military 
engagements, then the Constitution did not prevail during 
the Persian Gulf War, it became the first casualty.
Pfiffner, p. 18.
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